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The literature has shown that aggregate aid is mostly ineffective (Doucouliagos and 
Paldam, 2011). However, new studies on foreign aid also show that the effect of aid depends on 
both aid type and the donor type (Clemens et al., 2012; Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018). Thus, the 
first essay investigates the impact of education aid on educational outcomes. The study uses panel 
data for 83 developing countries from 2000-2014 to examine World Bank education aid. The 
results suggest that there is no robust evidence that education aid is effective in improving 
educational outcomes. The paper finds some evidence that aid improves enrollment rates in 
primary and secondary but not tertiary education. The results show that aid's effectiveness is 
determined, to a large extent, by the type of aid and the economic outcomes aid targeted. 
Likewise, the second essay examines whether specific types of aid are more effective 
across different donors. The study uses factor analysis to separate aid flows into interpretable 
categories, economic purposes, social purposes, and infrastructure. In addition, the study compares 
three donors, the World Bank, the U.S., and China. Examining the growth effect of each aid type 
for each donor shows that the impacts depend on aid type. All the aid types are positive irrespective 
of the donor, though only the U.S. aid types show some improvements economic growth. The 
 
 
Chinese economic aid is a complement of the World Bank economic aid. However, the Chinese 
social aid and the World Bank social aid are both substitutes.  
Both studies show that most foreign aid to developing countries is not effective, but 
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Foreign aid is support in the form of funding or technical knowledge from developed 
countries and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank given to developing countries for 
economic development and welfare improvement (Brautigam, 2009). According to WDR (2001), 
developing countries are countries with high poverty rates characterized by low per capita income 
and low human development. Furthermore, the low income leads to a low investment rate in all 
sectors of the economy, thereby stunting (or inhibiting) growth and cause more poverty. 
Specifically, these developing countries lack the required capital for investment and are thereby 
trapped in low growth.1  
Therefore, donors decide to provide the necessary funds for investment in these developing 
countries in the form of foreign aid.2 Several studies have examined the impact of aid. But these 
earlier studies focus mainly on the impact of Official Development Assistance (ODA), aggregate 
aid, and the general consensus points towards the claim that aid is not effective (Doucouliagos and 
Paldam, 2011). Due to this, the emerging studies in aid literature argue that though there might not 
be evidence that ODA leads to growth, disaggregate aid by sector or type can lead to moderate 
social, economic, and human development. Easterly (2003) succinctly captured this. He argues 
that we have not been able to achieve a beneficial aggregate impact of foreign aid. Therefore, aid 
 
1 This is a poverty trap or development trap when it applies to a developing country. This is when poverty is caused by self-reinforcing conditions, 
such as low income, low savings, and low investment in both human and physical capital, leading to low productivity and low economic growth. 
This is called a cycle or trap because once this occurs, poverty continues unless there is outside intervention. 
2 Donors refer to both developed countries and multilateral institutions that provide foreign aid to developing countries. 
 
2 
agencies should set more modest objectives. He contends that the goal of aid should simply be to 
benefit some poor people some of the time (increase welfare) and not a swaggering goal of 
fostering society-wide transformation, from poverty to wealth.3 Likewise, Michaelowa (2004) 
claims that examining aid types (or aid at the sectoral level ) makes it easier to account for factors 
that affect the relationship between aid and development, thereby making it easier to accurately 
examine the real impact of aid. 
Thus, the first essay examines the impact of education aid on educational outcomes. The 
results suggest that there is no robust evidence that education aid is effective in improving 
educational outcomes. However, I find some evidence that aid improves enrollment rates in 
primary and secondary, but not tertiary education. The results show that aid's effectiveness is 
determined, to a large extent, by the type of aid and the economic outcomes aid targeted. 
Likewise, the literature has shown that aid effectiveness can vary by both aid types and 
type of donor (Clemens et al., 2012; Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018; Palagashvili and Williamson 
2018). Thus, the second essay investigates the effectiveness of aid types, economic, social, and 
infrastructure across different donors, the World Bank, the U.S., and China. All the aid types are 
positive irrespective of the donor, though only the U.S. aid types improve economic growth. The 
Chinese economic aid is a complement of the World Bank economic aid. The results also indicate 
that Chinese social aid and the World Bank social aid are both substitutes. Overall, the results 
show that the impact of aid depends on aid type, and though the effect of all the aid types is 
positive, most aid types remain insignificant. Only the U.S. aid types show some improvement on 
economic growth, both the World Bank and Chinese aid types are insignificant.  
 
3 The swaggering goal here refers to using total aid to improve growth, and as earlier mentioned, the literature show this has not been successful. 
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These two essays support the claims of the emerging studies in aid literature that ODA 
might not be effective, but if we focus more on disaggregate aid, we could 1) eliminate the 
difficulties in measuring aid impact and 2) record a modest impact of aid. Both essays are presented 
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  The literature on official development aid and its impact on the economy of the recipient 
countries is vast, yet the results are mixed. Papers that report a positive effect of aid only report a 
minimal impact on national measures of economic outcomes (Clemens et al., 2012). Recent 
literature examines types of aid to gain a micro perspective, and studies have shown the effect of 
total aid is different from that of sectoral aid (aid to a specific sector of the economy, for instance, 
education sector, health sector, social infrastructure sector). The literature has shown that aid to 
specific sectors improves non-income dimensions of poverty, whereas total aid might not 
(Michealowa, 2004; Gopalan and Rajan, 2016). Thus, to increase the welfare of the poor, the focus 
should be on policies and investments aimed at reducing non-income dimensions of poverty (Cruz 
et al., 2015). As such, this paper examines the effectiveness of educational aid on educational 
outcomes.   
  Shirazi, Ali, and Mannap (2009) show that traditional income-based measures of well-
being such as per-capita-income may mask the real effect of foreign aid on development outcomes. 
Similarly, aid that increases the (non-income) welfare of the poor alleviates poverty but may not 
have any impact on growth or measured income (Gomanee et al. 2003). The economic outcome 
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of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) is not always the same as that of the sectoral aid. 
Thus, it is possible to record a negative or no impact on national estimates and record positive 
outcomes on sectoral measures of aid, such as literacy rate, life expectancy, infant mortality, and 
access to water. 
  Furthermore, some authors have shown no effect of aid on growth, but positive impact on 
other areas. Bjornskov (2013) finds that only reconstruction aid has direct positive effects on 
growth. Gopalan and Rajan (2016) examine aid effectiveness at the sector-specific level and find 
that aid to the water supply and sanitation sector improves access to water. In addition, a country 
needs to meet a certain development threshold or income level before aid can be effective. 
Moreover, Michaelowa (2004) contends that approaching aid at the sectoral level makes it easier 
to avoid the high intricacy of macro-level evaluations, which makes it extremely difficult to 
account for factors that affect the relationship between aid and development. In contrast, sectoral 
analysis of aid makes it easier to trace and identify the relevance of aid fungibility and the impact 
of good governance in recipient countries of education aid. Likewise, Williamson (2008) argues 
that due to the recent change of focus from economic development to human development, 
analyzing the effectiveness of aid in promoting human development through increases in human 
welfare, such as literacy, mortality, and life expectancy, should be a major focus in the literature. 
  This shift in broadening the scope of development can be seen by the adoption of the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which has been subsumed under the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs have expanded the scope of MDGs. 
Specifically, SDG 4 aims to provide access and quality education for all (Gopalan and Rajan, 
2016). Thus, traditional donors, such as the World Bank, have shifted focus from economic 
 
7 
development to human development and welfare with the main aim of achieving SDGs (Sachs, 
2015; UNDP, 2019). 
  This paper evaluates how effective donors are at achieving one specific MDG, MDG goal 
2, which is providing education for all by 2015 measured by educational outcomes. We examine 
this MDG goal between 2000-2014 because this is the period donors’ objective is to provide access 
to education. We wish to examine whether this goal is achieved, which is important because it 
relates to the current SDGs goal 4. We test whether this objective was achieved during this period. 
Michaelowa and Weber (2008) stress the importance of education to economic development and 
education as a fundamental human right. Education aid is a source of empowerment for the poor 
through the provision of better education (Dreher et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, education enhances growth through investment in human capital. The new 
endogenous growth and augmented Solow models show that education is positively related to 
growth (Romer, 1990; Mankiw et al., 1992; Asiedu and Nandwa, 2007). Likewise, the rate of 
investment in education and the stock of human capital increases growth (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 
1990; Keller, 2006). 
However, the investment in human capital requires a substantial amount of money which 
developing countries may lack because they are a capital scarce country (Asiedu,2002; 
Alanvinasab, 2013; Fakutiju, 2017). To realize the second MDGs goal, achieving universal basic 
education by 2015 as outline by the United Nations, donors must fully commit to education aid 
(Dreher et al., 2006; Asiedu and Nandwa, 2007). Education aid is a channel to help developing 
countries invest in human capital. Aid can be channeled to developing countries in three major 
ways: monetary transfer, conditionality, and knowledge transfer (Dutta and Williamson, 2016a). 
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  Direct money transfer can help to supplement the educational budget of the government. 
Education aid can be used to increase investment in education (Asiedu and Nandwa, 2007). For 
example, education aid can finance building schools, hiring teachers and administration, training 
of teachers, providing textbooks and other school supplies. Likewise, education aid conditional on 
good macroeconomic policy and institutional quality in the recipient countries can help reduce 
mismanagement of education aid funds. The last channel is through knowledge transfer, skills, 
proficiency, and technical knowledge provided by the donor. 
  Nevertheless, foreign aid can make the government less accountable to civil society and 
the people, thus entrenching corruption and mismanagement as compared to a government that 
must rely on tax revenue as its main source of revenue (Ross, 2001; Dutta, Fakutiju and 
Williamson, 2019). Likewise, donors can exploit technical assistants to promote their interests and 
cause greater harm. Technical assistants often lack local knowledge; thus, their actions may be 
detrimental to growth (Palagashvili and Williamson, 2018). Overall, foreign aid can be stolen, 
wasted, or mismanaged, causing rent-seeking, inefficiencies, and corruption (Dutta and 
Williamson, 2016a). Thus, aid’s impact on education is ambiguous.4 
  Among the papers that examine aid at a disaggregated level, we find four studies that are 
closely related to our work. All four papers use disaggregated education aid, to examine the effect 
of education attainments in developing countries. Michaelowa (2004) finds that aid increases gross 
primary enrollment with good political and institutional conditions mattering for aid effectiveness. 
Michaelowa and Weber (2008) examine the impact of education aid on all education outcomes 
 
4 Roberts (2003) finds that an understanding of the local characteristics of the recipient is important for aid to be effective. Dreher (2006) finds that 
aid increases primary school enrollments. Weber (2006) shows that aid effectiveness depends on various dimensions of governance. Wolf (2007) 
reports that education aid improves education outcomes, while total aid has a negative impact on economic outcomes.  Michaelowa and Weber 
(2007) find that aid effectiveness depends on political governance. Aseidu and Gyimah-Brempong (2008) show that aid has a positive impact on 
both primary enrollment rates and completion rate. 
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(primary, secondary, and tertiary education). Although they provide some evidence that education 
aid improves education outcomes, the estimated effects are low. Dreher el at. (2008) examine both 
the impact of education aid and domestic government spending on education outcomes. Their 
findings show that higher per capita aid increases primary school enrolment, but domestic 
government spending does not. 
  Similarly, Asiedu and Nandwa (2007) find that the effect of education aid varies by income 
level. They show a modest contribution of education aid to educational outcomes and that a good 
macroeconomic environment and institutional quality matters for aid effectiveness. 
  However, these prior works have data limitations. First, at the time of their analysis they 
all were limited to one data source, the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of OECD/ DAC. Second, 
these works examine education aid by bilateral DAC (Development Assistance Committee) donors 
only. According to Asiedu and Nandwa (2007), data on education aid for a multilateral donor, such 
as the World Bank, was not readily available as of 2007. Our paper builds from these previous 
works to examine the effect of the World Bank education aid, a traditional DAC member and 
multilateral donor, using the recently available AidData. 
Aid from the World Bank, a  multilateral donor, is positioned theoretically to be effective 
(Dreher et al., 2017; 2018a). The World Bank shifted focus from production and economic sectors 
to social and human sectors after adopting MDGs. During the 2000s, traditional donors increase 
aid spending to social sectors to more than 60 percent of total aid, up from 30 percent in the 1970s 
(Frot & Santiso, 2010; Kilama, 2016). Due to the World Bank's wealth of experience in aid 
allocation, it mandates its professionals to carry out both technical feasibility and economic 
viability before the aid project's execution. Other traditional donors often adopt the World Bank 
feasibility studies on aid projects as policy recommendations to guide their own aid decisions 
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(Dreher et al., 2018b). Moreover, the World Bank always reappraises its foreign aid's aims and 
objectives to solve current developing countries' issues (Dreher et al., 2018b).  
Compared to bilateral donors, the World Bank provides substantially more education aid 
between 2000-2014 than bilateral donors. For the U.S., the highest ODA donor, education aid is 
only 30% of the World Bank education within the same period. For China, the fastest-growing 
bilateral donor, education aid is only 1.96% of World Bank education between 2000-2014.5 Also, 
as compared to multilateral aid, bilateral aid has typically followed the donors' interests and not 
necessarily the recipients' needs. Diplomatic ties such as military alliances, trade partnerships, 
former colonial relations, access to natural resources, forming or rewarding political allies, and 
achieving foreign policy agenda of the donors have greatly influenced bilateral aid allocation 
(Brautigam, 2010; Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Kilama, 2016; Furuoka, 2017). Moreover, previous 
studies point to a considerable gap between bilateral (DAC) donors' rhetoric of rewarding good 
governance and their actual aid allocation (Isopi & Mattesini, 2010; Dreher and Fuchs, 2015). 
Thus, according to Alvi & Senbeta (2011), aid from multilateral sources does better in poverty 
reduction than bilateral sources. 
Nevertheless, to justify the World Bank's existence, the Bank is sometimes constrained to 
extend further aid to recipients who failed to conform to aid conditions (Easterly, 2006). 
Furthermore, aid from multilateral institutions often helps the capitalist market creation to serve 
corporate interests in modern capitalist democracies (Husain, 2017). Again, due to the bureaucratic 
nature and sometimes detailed policy conditionality of multilateral donors, it takes more time to 
get things done (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Dreher et al., 2018b). Specifically, a contract that would 
 
5 From 2000-2014, the U.S. ODA was $452billion with $13.6billion as education aid. The Chinese ODA was $59billion with $880million as 
education aid, and the World Bank ODA was 407.75billion with $44.92billion as education aid (Kitano, 2014; Strange et al., 2017; USAID,2020). 
This shows that other donors focus more on the provision of other aid types (rather than education aid). Therefore, in another paper, we examine 
all aid types' impact across all donors—multilateral and bilateral (Fakutiju, 2020 forthcoming). 
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take five years to discuss, negotiate, and sign with the World Bank takes less than a year when 
dealing with some bilateral donors such as China. (Dreher et al., 2018b). Thus, the World Bank 
aid's effect is ambiguous. 
Empirically, there is no consensus on the effect of World Bank aid in the literature. 
Gehring, Kaplan, and Wong (2019) provide evidence that the World Bank aid projects strengthen 
democratic values in recipient countries. The World Bank aid projects stimulate local economic 
activity without proof of it fueling local corruption (Isaksson & Kotsadam, 2018). Meanwhile, 
according to Dreher et al. (2018b), World Bank aid projects do not impact economic activities' 
spatial distribution. That is, the World Bank aid does not solve the problem of inequality, the 
economic disparities that exist within and across subnational localities. Likewise, Dreher et al. 
(2017) find no robust evidence that World Bank aid promotes growth. Therefore, our paper 
attempts to resolve the ambiguity in foreign aid by the World Bank. 
Thus, we seek to fill the research gap by examining the effectiveness of the World Bank 
education aid in the sector of education. Specifically, we test whether the World Bank education 
aid improves educational outcomes (primary, secondary, and tertiary) in developing countries. We 
build from the previous studies by using the relatively new AidData database. This database is 
becoming a standard alternative to OECD-DAC data because it provides a more comprehensive 
account of global aid flows by the World Bank. We measure the World Bank education aid as a 
percentage of the population for the recipient country. Our measure of educational outcomes is the 
gross enrollment ratio, both sexes (%) for primary, secondary, and tertiary. The data is from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI, 2017). 
  Aid endogeneity is a serious challenge all studies face. The economic attributes of recipient 
countries may simultaneously influence educational outcomes and aid allocation. Similarly, 
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educational outcomes usually correlate with other development outcomes such as income, growth, 
life expectancy rate, and mortality rate. Thus, endogeneity can also arise due to omitted variable 
bias (Michealowa and Weber, 2007; Bjornskov, 2013; Dutta and Williamson 2016a; Dreher et al., 
2017). We follow existing literature on aid and externally instrument for aid (Kilby, 2009; Alesina 
& Dollar, 2000; Dreher et al., 2018a). Thus, we use the time demeaning transformation of our 
endogenous variable (education aid) and the group means of the exogenous variables as 
instruments (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 327; Greene, 2018, p.430). 
  Our results provide some evidence that educational aid improves educational outcomes, 
though the actual effect depends on the level of education the donor is targeting. Our results show 
some indications that education aid improves gross enrollment rates in primary and secondary, but 
not in tertiary education. These results are sensitive to the choice of controls: government 
expenditure on education, GDP per capita, GDP growth, urban population, political freedom index, 
openness (trade % of GDP), and the inflation rate. 
 
2.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.2.1 Main data 
 We use project-level data, as reported by AidData.org.6 Our dataset covers the period from 
2000-2014, which is the period when donors’ objective is to provide access to education. 
According to Bjornskov (2013) and Nielsen et al. (2011), AidData is becoming a standard 
alternative to OECD data in the aid literature because it provides a more comprehensive account 
of global aid flows. For instance, between 2000-2014, figures from AidData show that the World 
 
6 Thanks to Seth Goodman at AidData.org for providing the data. 
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Bank provided aid to 143 countries with $407.75billion as ODA and $44.92billion as education 
aid.7 Meanwhile, figures from OECD-DAC/CRS show that the World Bank provides aid to 83 
countries with $122billion as ODA and $8billion as education aid. 
In addition, AidData provides detailed information about aid projects compared to the 
OECD-DAC/CRS dataset (Dreher & Lohmann, 2015). Each dataset provides a summary sub-
heading (e.g., education facilities). AidData further states the exact activities aid project money is 
used for, whether to construct school buildings (new or rehabilitates existing ones) or finance new-
model research laboratories and equipment. The detailed information by AidData makes it possible 
to correctly identify the development indicator to measure with aid money, thus, helping to 
measure aid impact accurately. Also, all data are in project form according to their purpose codes. 
We use AidData because it allows us to empirically examine World Bank education aid as 
classified by education purpose codes (Goodman et al., 2019). 
Education aid is our independent variable of interest. The education aid projects are 
classified into education levels specified (primary, secondary, and post-secondary), and 
educational levels unspecified (education aid projects given to two or more educational levels).8 
Although a unique project id identifies each project in the World Bank education aid, the activities 
carried out by each project are not unique. For instance, if a particular project is earmarked to 
complete a certain activity (e.g., school construction), the same project still provides money for 
computers and other school materials including textbooks, school bags, and uniforms; this is not 
an exemption. It is the norm for all the World Bank projects for each project to complete multiple 
 
7The World Bank completed 5,532 unique ODA projects and 585 unique education aid projects from 2000-2014. 
8 Our paper includes only projects officially marked implementation or completion in the status column. Meanwhile, projects marked as a pledge, 
pipeline, suspended, or canceled are excluded from our dataset. This is consistent with the literature and AidData. The World bank aid data have 
both commitment and disbursement columns. Thus, we use the disbursement amount, but when the disbursement amount is missing, and the project 
is marked implementation or completion, we fill in the commitment value. We analyze the dataset at the national level using the country name as 
recipients and include only project aid given to specific countries, thus exclude regional aid that cannot be assigned to one country. 
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activities simultaneously. A complete list of completed World Bank education aid projects is in 
Table 2.1. 
The project length of the World Bank aid is 1 to 16 years.9 Thus we split the actual amount 
disbursed per project by the project length. For instance, if a project's duration is seven years, we 
spread the amount spent on that project into the seven-year duration; therefore, we have the average 
amount spent per year on each project.10 
According to the literature, countries above a certain development threshold have generally 
reached universal primary education, and so are not of interest in examining the effectiveness of 
education aid. Thus, we select only low-or middle-income countries as defined by the World Bank  
(Fantom and Serajuddin, 2016). Second, the countries included must belong to developing 
countries as defined by DAC regardless of whether they are low- or middle-income countries. This 
is consistent with education aid literature. (Michaelowa, 2004; Michaelowa and Weber, 2007; 
2008; Dreher et al., 2006; 2008). 
After applying both criteria above, our paper includes only 83 low- and middle-income 
countries (see Table 2.3) who are strictly defined as developing countries by the World Bank,  
United Nations Statistics, and IMF (Fantom and Serajuddin, 2016; DAC, 2018). The  83  low- and 
middle-income developing countries received World Bank aid between 2000-2014, with 
$293.55billion as completed ODA projects and $37.88billion spent on education aid projects (see 
 
9 This shows the duration of the year of the World Bank aid project. This includes whether the World Bank is building schools or providing school 
materials, computers, or scholarships during the duration of a particular project.  
10 We provide an example of a specific recipient in Table 2.2. 
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Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2, and Figure 2.3).11 We use annual data, and the World Bank education aid 
per capita is in log form.12 
Our dependent variables and measure of educational outcomes are the gross enrollment 
ratio (GER), both sexes (%) for primary, secondary, and tertiary education (Figure 2.4).13 GER is 
the number of students enrolled in a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a 
percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same education level. The 
main limitation of GER is that the ratio may exceed 100% due to the inclusion of students who are 
1) repeating a grade, 2) those who enrolled late and are older than their classmates, or 3) those who 
have advanced quickly and are younger than their classmates (UNDP, 2020). The gross enrollment 
data is collected from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017).14 We lead the 
enrollment rates by three years to adjust for the long-term impact of education aid (Asiedu and 
Nandwa, 2007).15 
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.4. The aid amount is in 2011 USD. As shown 
in the table, the average of the World Bank education aid is $1.29per capita, with a standard 
deviation of 3.94.16 Likewise, the mean of the third-year enrolment rates primary, secondary, and 
 
11 Out of the 83 developing countries, 77 received World education aid, and the Bank completed 418 unique education aid projects with 
$37.88billion from 2000-2014 in the 77 countries. The remaining six countries received other types of aid but not World Bank education aid (we 
further account for these other World bank aid types in our robustness check two). In the 83 countries, figures 2.1 and 2.2 show a steady increase 
in the World Bank ODA and World Bank education aid between 2000-2014. Nevertheless, the figures ( 2.1 and 2.2) also show that both aid figures 
have severe outliers. If not corrected, this might impact our results. Thus, to correct these aid outliers, we remove all the countries with outliers in 
the World Bank education aid and show only countries without outliers in the World Bank education aid (Figure 2.3). The countries without outliers 
in the World Bank education aid between 2000-20114 are 62 countries (see Figure 2.3). 
12 World Bank education aid as a percentage of the population for the recipient country—as mentioned in the introduction. 
Figure 2.4 shows that the increase in enrollment rates depends on the educational level (primary, secondary, and tertiary). Nevertheless, we see 
some increases in the enrollment rates between 2000-2014. 
14Completion rates are good educational outcomes measures too, but there is no available data for secondary and tertiary completion rates. Likewise, 
there is no strong standard measure to examine education quality across countries—e.g., test scores (Michaelowa and Weber 2007;2008; WDI, 
2017). 
15 Asiedu and Nandwa (2007) averaged their education aid data over a three-year period to measure the long-term impact of education aid. This 
method and the lead-three enrollment rates we employ in this paper measure the impact of education aid in the third year. 
16 The average World Bank education per capita of $1.29 is the average aid amount spent on educational projects by the World Bank between 2000-
2014, irrespective of the country. We gave an example of the amount spent on a specific project, the duration, and what the aid money was spent 
on for a specific country in Table 2.2. 
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tertiary education are 83.93, 48.01, and 14.06, with a corresponding standard deviation of 44.12, 
33.74, and 15.581, respectively.17 
 
2.2.2 Econometric analysis 
Our model of interest is: 
yit+3  =  x1it′ β1  +  x2it′ β2  +  μi  +  εit (2.1) 
 
Where yit+3 is the 3-year lead of the gross enrollment ratio, both sexes (%): primary, secondary, 
and tertiary for country i in time t+3. That is, we led the dependent variable by three years to adjust 
for the long-term impact of education aid. The 2000 values of the explanatory variables are related 
to the enrollment rates in 2003. Likewise, the 2001 values of the explanatory variables are related 
to the enrollment rates in 2004. This continues until 2011 values of the explanatory variables are 
related to the enrollment rates in 2014. (Michaelowa and Weber, 2008; Dreher et al., 2017). x1it  
are exogenous variables that vary over time and countries (that is, it is uncorrelated with μi). x2it 
are endogenous variables that vary over time and countries (that is, it correlated with μi).  
In our model, x1it is a vector of exogenous control variables. x2it is education aid per capita 
for country i in time t, which is endogenous (the other endogenous variable in the model is: 
 
17 For the following explanatory variables in Table 2.4:  government expenditure on education (% of total government expenditure), GDP per capita, 
GDP growth, Urban population (% of Total), Political freedom index, Trade (%of GDP), the inflation rates, and our dependent variables (enrollment 
rates primary, secondary and tertiary education), we use the linear trend formula to fix the missing values by country. For instance, if in 2001, a 
country's GDP growth is 4.13808, but its 2002 value is blank, while its 2003 GDP growth is 5.04164, using the linear trend formula, its 2002 GDP 
growth will be 4.58986. When a country does not have any observation for a particular variable or the observations are too low to use the linear 
trend formula, the variable is left blank for that country. Likewise, we find and replace the outliers for each variable with either the upper bound or 
the lower bound value for that variable. That is,  if the outlier is greater than the upper bound, we replace the value with the upper bound, and if the 
outlier is lesser than the lower bound, we replaced the value with the lower bound. This is necessary because outliers in these variables might 
influence our results. We did this for each of the explanatory variables listed above separately. This process is not applicable to the World education 
aid, we have explained how we treated the World Bank education aid earlier in the data and methodology section. Further explanation on the World 
Bank education aid is in the result section. 
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government expenditure on education).18 The μi is the country-specific random term, and it 
contains the unobserved individual effects. The εit is an error term. This model is called the 
Hausman Taylor instrumental variables estimator (HT-IV). The HT-IV is an instrumental variables 
estimator that uses only the information within the model. We use this instead of incorporating 
traditional IVs from outside the model.19 The instruments used by HT-IV are: First, the time 
demeaning transformation of the endogenous variables (education aid and government expenditure 
on education). This is, taking  deviations from group means. That is: x᷉2it = x2it - x̅2it this 
transformation eliminates correlation with μi (Wooldridge, 2002, p. .327; Greene, 2018, p. 430). 
Thus, we have x᷉2it as suitable instrument for x2it. Second, the exogenous variables are instruments 
for themselves. Therefore, according to Wooldridge (2002, pp.327) and Greene (2018, p. 430) the 
complete instruments for the HT-IV method are: x᷉2it  and x᷉1it.20 
We follow the existing literature on education aid in including the control variables. We 
add GDP per capita to control for income levels in the recipient countries (Dreher et al., 2006). 
We include government expenditure on education (% of total government expenditure) to control 
for recipient countries’ expenditure on education in a particular year (Dreher et al., 2006; 
Michaelowa, 2007). The rate of inflation and openness (Trade as % of GDP) captures the policy 
environment and good governance in the recipient countries  (Michaelowa and Weber, 2008). GDP 
growth is another measure of macroeconomic environment that we controlled for. The share of 
 
18 Just like education aid, government expenditure on education is endogenous because enrolment rates and government expenditure on education 
can simultaneously determine each other. We instrument for this too. All the other explanatory variables are exogenous (Michaelowa and Weber 
2007). 
19 This is due to lack of credible external instruments that can passed all the instruments’ tests 
20 According to Wooldridge (2002, p.327), the "time-demeaned transformation" of an endogenous variable is a valid instrument of that endogenous 
variable. An endogenous variable's time-demeaned transformation is truly exogenous. It does not correlate with either the individual fixed effect μi 
or the idiosyncratic error term (εit). It is only correlated with the endogenous variable. This time-demeaned transformation underscores the fixed 
effect model called fixed effect transformation which eliminates the correlation with μi. This shows the validity of these instruments used by HT-
IV. Again, these instruments are valid too if some elements of x2it (education aid in the original equation) are simultaneously determined with yit 
(enrolment rates)  (Wooldridge, 2002 pp,328). Test of overidentifying restrictions is only needed if we have time-invariant endogenous variable in 
the model because we must have sufficient number of elements in the group means for x1it (x̅1it) to act as instruments for the time-invariant 




urban population in total population controls for urbanization, which may impact enrollment ratios 
(Dreher et al., 2008). These control variables are from the World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, 2017). 
Political freedom index controls for institutional quality in the recipient countries of aid. 
Political freedom index is from the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties 
(Freedom house, 2003). We controlled for all the above measures of the macroeconomic 
environment, and institutional quality because the literature has shown that the effectiveness of aid 
is conditional on good macroeconomic policy and institutional quality in the recipient countries of 
aid. If the policy is poor, aid will be ineffective. (Mosley et al., 2004; Rady, 2012; Fiodendji and 
Evlo, 2013; Cai et al., 2018).21 
Due to education aid’s  endogeneity, we build off the existing literature on aid and employ 
the Hausman Taylor instrumental variable (HT-IV) estimation to control for endogeneity 
(Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 299-328; Greene, 2018, pp. 427-431). The economic attributes of recipient 
countries may simultaneously influence educational outcomes and aid allocation. For example, 
poorer countries are likely to have low education levels and tend to receive higher education aid 
levels.  
That is, being a poor country can determine the extent of aid inflows, as one of the major 
focuses of foreign aid is poverty reduction. Similarly, educational outcomes usually correlate with 
other development outcomes such as income, growth, life expectancy rate, and mortality rate. 
Thus, endogeneity can also arise due to omitted variable bias (Michealowa and Weber, 2007; 
 
21 Our model specification  is consistent with the education aid literature (Dreher et al., 2006; Michaelowa and Weber 2007 & 2008; Asiedu and 
Nandwa, 2007). Furthermore, we test for the presence of serious multicollinearity in our model,  the diagnostics (see Table 2.5) show that the 
variance inflation factors (VIF) of the variables are less than 2.5. This shows there is no presence of serious multicollinearity in our model.   
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Bjornskov, 2013; Dutta and Williamson, 2016a; Dreher et al., 2017).22 Failure to control for the 
endogeneity of aid leads to biased and inconsistent estimators in the OLS and RE model 
(Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 299-328; Michaelowa and Weber, 2007; Williamson, 2008; Greene, 2018, 
pp, 427-431; Bjornskov, 2013; Dreher et al., 2017).23. HT-IV method corrects for this endogeneity 
by using the time demeaning transformation of our endogenous variables (education aid, and 
government expenditure on education) as instruments for education aid and the government 
expenditure on education. 
We employ annual data rather than data average over three-, four-, or five-year periods 
(Michaelowa and Weber 2008; Dreher et al.,2017). According to Dreher et al, (2017), in order to 
show the actual effect of aid, it requires several observations (in thousands) rather than a sample 
of roughly 475 observations that we would have if we averaged our data over three-year-periods.24 
To adjust for the long-term impact of education aid, we lead the dependent variables by three years 
(Asiedu and Nandwa, 2007).25 
 
 
22 Furthermore, donors' interests in a specific country, such as forming or rewarding political allies,  trade partnerships, access to natural resources,  
military alliances, or achieving the donor's foreign policy agenda, do correlate with aid leading to omitted variable bias. Although the World Bank 
is a multilateral aid donor, its major financiers are the Western developed countries, and they represent the Western political ideologies and interests 
(Kitano, 2014; Dreher et al., 2017). Thus, to some extent, the World Bank's aid allocation might reflect its financiers' interests. 
23 If αi, the individual country characteristics, is unobserved but correlated with χit: our explanatory variable (education aid), then the least squares 
estimator of our estimated coefficient: γ is biased and inconsistent as a consequence of an omitted variable (Wooldridge, 2002 pp,325; Greene, 
2018,pp,430). 
24 According to Dreher et al. (2017), this high number of required observations is driven by the fixed-effects setting, as both country-and time-fixed 
effects capture most of the variation in the dependent variable so that the variation caused by aid conditional on these fixed effects is rather small. 
25 Also, theoretically, a medium to long term impact starts from three to 5 years. Again, some education aid project’s impact is less than a year, e.g., 
the provision of school materials—textbooks, school uniforms, and scholarships. Meanwhile, other education aid projects might take up to 2 or 4 
years to complete, like constructing new schools or renovating existing ones, or building laboratories. Thus, to account for both medium and long-




2.3.1 Main results 
  Tables 2.6, 2.7, 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11 report the HT-IV estimations’ results in four columns.26 
In Column 1, we control for both income levels (GDP per capita ) and the macroeconomic 
environment (GDP growth) in the recipient countries. In column 2, we add institutional quality 
(political freedom index), and the urban population’s share in total population, which control for 
urbanization. In column 3, we add control for policy environment and good governance (inflation 
rate ). Again, we control for government expenditure on education in column 3. Finally, we add 
another control of policy environment (openness) in column 4.We present the results of both HT-
IV and two stage least square (2sls) cross-sectional regression. 
  Before running HT-IV, we test for aid endogeneity. In all regressions, the results of the 
Hausman tests and the robust Hausman tests show that the unobserved individual characteristics 
and the explanatory variable are correlated. These Hausman test results are reported in all tables 
and columns.27 
  Table 2.6 presents regression results for the impact of World Bank education aid per capita 
on educational outcomes in recipient countries. The HT-IV results (in Table 2.6) show that the 
effectiveness of the World Bank education per capita depends on educational outcomes. World 
Bank education aid per capita has a positive effect on all enrollment rates but is significant only 
on primary and secondary enrollments. In all the enrolment rates, the estimated coefficients of the 
World Bank education aid per capita reduces as we add more controls. 
 
26 The columns contain the control variables in order of their importance. And Table 2.8 reports 2sls cross-sectional regression.  
27 The Sargan-Hansen Statistics is a robust Hausman test. These results show that the FE is consistent, while the RE is biased and inconsistent. 
Furthermore, the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variable of both FE and HT-IV estimations are close. These results show that both models 
are consistent. HT-IV is often more efficient, with smaller std errors. Thus, we present only the results of the HT-IV estimation method. The results 




  For gross enrolment rates primary education (Table 2.6, columns 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A), the 
World Bank education aid per capita is significant at 1 percent level in the first three columns 
while it is only significant at 5 percent level in the last column (4A). That is, a one percent increase 
in the World Bank education aid per capita will lead to a 0.0828, 0.0697, 0.0695, and 0.0576 
percent increase in gross enrollment rates in primary education in columns 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4A, 
respectively. To provide more insight, picking column 4A, for instance, at the mean level of third-
year primary enrollment rates of 83.93 and mean World Bank education aid per capita exp(0.513) 
= $1.67 a one percent increase in the World Bank education aid per capita would be expected to 
increase enrollment rates primary education to 83.99 percent.28 Suppose a recipient country has a 
population of 10 million people, with 1,000,000 school-age children, a one percent increase in the 
World Bank education aid per capita (about $167,000) would lead to about 576 more children in 
primary school.29  
Likewise, for gross enrolment rates secondary education (see Table 2.6), the World Bank 
education aid per capita is significant at 1 percent and 5 percent levels in columns 1B and 2B, but 
it is only significant at 10 percent level in both columns 3B and 4B. A one percent increase in the 
World Bank education aid per capita will lead to a 0.0368, 0.0334, 0.0288, and 0.0247 percent 
increase in gross enrolment rates secondary education in columns 1B, 2B, 3B, and 4B, 
respectively. From columns 4B, the economic importance indicates that at the mean level of third-
year secondary enrollment rates of 48.01 percent and mean education aid per capita exp)0.513 
=$1.67, a one percent increase in the World Bank education aid per capita would be expected to 
 
28 83.93 percent + 0.0576 percent equal 83.99 percent. We use column 4 in all regressions to explain the economic importance because it has all 
the controls. 
29 The mean of the World Bank education aid per capita is exp(0.513)= $1.67. That is, $16,7 million for a country of 10 million people. One percent 
of $16.7million is $167,0000. Again, 0.0576 percent of 1,000,000 school children equal 576. 
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increase enrollment rates secondary education to 48.03 percent.30 To illustrate further, we can still 
use a hypothetical recipient country of 10 million people, with 1,000,000 school-age children, a 
one percent increase in the World Bank education aid per capita (about $167,000) would lead to 
about 247 more children in secondary school.31  
The results in Table 2.6 need to be treated with caution because, as noted earlier, the World 
Bank education aid has severe outliers (Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). This might partially be 
influencing our results in Table 2.6. To further examine this, we split the data into equal sub-
samples of five periods (2000-2002; 2003-2005; 2006-2008; 2009-2011; and 2012-2014). Each 
sub-sample is an annual data of three years.32 We rerun all the estimations on each sub-sample 
using lead1gross enrolment rates as our dependent variable. This is because each period has only 
three year's data. Thus, we cannot lead our dependent variable by two or three years as we did in 
the rest of the paper. 
The sub-samples results indicate that in sub-sample one (2000-2002, columns 1 to 4), the 
World Bank education aid per capita is negative and significant on all enrolment rates. Its sign 
alternates between positive and negative in sub-samples two and three but insignificant on all 
enrolment rates. It is positive in both sub-samples four and five but only significant in period four 
for all the enrollment rates.  
These sub-samples results should still be treated with caution, too, due to very low 
observation in each period (249) compared to 1,245 observations in our main results. Again, each 
sub-sample was only able to measure the World Bank education aid's three-year impact compared 
 
30 48.01 percent + 0.0247percent equal 48.03 percent. 
31 The mean of the World Bank education aid per capita is exp(0.513)= $1.67. That is, $16,7 million for a country of 10 million people. One percent 
of $16.7million is $167,0000. Again, 0.0247 percent of 1,000,000 school children equal 247. 
32 This allows us to examine the World Bank education aid for three years for each sub-sample. We do not average the periods, neither do we 
combine the averages of the periods into a single dataset. Though averaging might smoothen the data across the periods, it does not remove the 
exact  outliers. The sub-samples annual data allow us to examine the World Bank education aid by periods and see whether any period, in particular, 
is seriously impacting our results.    
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to 15 years impact in our main results. Thus, we do not include the tables for the results of these 
sub-samples in our paper. Yet, the results from the sup-sample show that Table 2.6 results need to 
be treated with caution. Therefore, to better measure the impact of the World Bank education aid 
per capita, from our dataset, we strictly selected only countries without outliers in the World Bank 
education aid (Figure 2.3). Out of the 83 recipient countries in our dataset, only 62 countries are 
without outliers in the World Bank education aid. We rerun all the estimations only on these 62 
selected countries using annual data and lead3enrolment rates as our dependent variables; the result 
is presented in Table 2.7. 
 Table 2.7 reports the results of the World Bank education aid per capita on educational 
outcomes in only 62 selected recipient countries without outliers in the World Bank education aid 
per capita. The results indicate that the World Bank education aid per capita’s impact and signs of 
its estimated coefficients depend on the enrollment rates. Again, as we add more controls, the 
estimated coefficients of the World Bank education aid per capita reduce in all the enrollment 
rates. For gross enrolment rates in primary education, the World Bank education aid per capita is 
positive and significant at a 1 percent level in all columns. A one percent increase in the World 
Bank education aid per capita will lead to 0.109, 0.0943, 0.0898, and 0.0771 percent increase in 
gross enrolment rates in primary education, respectively. This indicates, for instance, in column 
4A, a one percent increase in the World Bank education aid per capita would increase enrollment 
rates in primary education to 84.01 percent.33 This also shows that in a country of 10 million 
people, with 1,000,000 school-age children, a one percent increase in the World Bank education 
aid per capita (about $167,000) would lead to about 771 more children in primary education.34 
 
33 This is at the mean level of third-year primary enrollment rates of 83.93. Thus, 83.93 percent + 0.0771 percent equal 84.0071 percent. 
34 This is at the mean level of the education aid per capita exp(0.513)=$1.67. And 0.0771percent * 1, 000,000 is 771. 
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Meanwhile, for gross enrollment rates secondary education (in Table 2.7), though the 
estimated coefficients of the World Bank education aid per capita are positive in all the columns, 
it loses significance as we add more controls. It is significant at a 5 percent level in columns 1B, 
2B, and 3B but significant at 10 percent in column 4B. A one percent increase in the World Bank 
education aid per capita will lead to 0.0410, 0.0378, 0.0342, and 0.0297 percent increase in gross 
enrolment rates secondary education, respectively. Using column 4B, the result indicates that a 
one percent increase in the World Bank education aid per capita would increase secondary 
education's enrollment rates to 48.04 percent.35 Still using a country of 10 million people with 
1,000,000 school-age children, as an example, a one percent increase in the World Bank education 
aid per capita will lead to about 297 more children in secondary school (column 4B).36 For gross 
enrolment rates in tertiary education, the World Bank education per capita is negative and 
insignificant in all the columns. 
Comparing our main results in Table 2.6 with Table 2.7 indicates that Table 2.7 results 
performed better on both primary and secondary enrollment rates as we have more children in 
school for both enrollment rates.37 This shows that the significance levels in our main results (Table 




35 This is at the mean level of third-year secondary enrollment rates of 48.01.Thus, 48.01percent + 0.0297 percent give us 48.0397 percent. 
36 That is, 1,000,000 * 0.0297 percent equal 297 
37 The results in Table 2.7 with 62 selected countries without outliers in the World education aid is the most conservative and moderate way to 
measure the World Bank education aid effectiveness in recipient countries 
38 We further look closely into education aid project activities completed by the World Bank in these outlier projects. We found that these activities 
are not different from those without outliers (this further shows that the outliers belong to the data). The major difference is that when the Bank 
sees the need, it completed more activities per project or completed the activities in many more communities or states (than it normally does), 
thereby leading to outliers. Two examples of the outliers are: Between 2000-2003, the World Bank finance the expansion of secondary schools in 
several states at once in Brazil. This same project still includes providing textbooks to students, furnishing classrooms in several schools, providing 
teachers’ access to teaching guides, and many others at all educational levels. Another example, from 2010-2014, the World Bank provides 
$700million to support the ongoing secondary school expansion in Mexico. The same project still provides scholarships to 250,000 students from 
poor households across Mexico. These projects are big compared to the usual World Bank projects that complete fewer educational activities and 
in fewer locations. 
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Table 2.8 reports the result of the 2sls cross-sectional regression.39 The result indicates that 
on aggregate, the World Bank education aid per capita improves enrollment rates in primary 
education but not in secondary and tertiary education. Cumulatively, the World Bank education 
aid per capita for the fifteen-year period will improve primary school enrollment rates by 0.0035, 
0.0072, 0.0051, and 0.0044 in columns 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D, respectively. For instance, a country 
with 15 million school-age children for the fifteen-year period (1 million per year) will have 66,000 
more children in primary school after the fifteen years.40 The estimated coefficient of the total 
World Bank education per capita is positive on both secondary and tertiary (only enter with a 
negative in the last column) school enrollment rates, but it’s not significant. 
Overall, our results show some indications that education aid improves enrollment rates in 
both primary and secondary education but not in tertiary education. These results show that the 
impact of sector-specific aid given to promote human development and increase welfare, such as 
the literacy rate, depends on development outcomes measured. Specifically, education aid's impact 
depends on education levels measured (primary, secondary, or tertiary). This is consistent with 
education aid literature (Michaelowa, 2004; Dreher et al., 2006; Michaelowa and Weber, 2007 & 
2008; and Asiedu and Nandwa, 2007). 
 
39 For the cross-sectional regression: our explanatory variable is the total education aid per capita received over the entire sample period (fifteen 
years). While percentage change in enrolment rates (enrollment rates at the end of the sample period – enrollment rates at the beginning of the same 
period) is our dependent variable. Specifically, we use this percent change formula 100*(end year-first year)/first year. We use the same percent 
change formula for all our control variables individually for each country, except the political freedom index, which we averaged for the sample 
period for each country because the political freedom index hardly changes from year to year. Our instrument represents donor-recipient political 
alignment in United Nations voting. The political alignment is proxied for by ideal points distance from donors to recipient countries. The data is 
collected from the United Nations voting data (Bailey, Strezhnev, & Voeten, 2017). The instrument captures the UN voting similarity pattern 
between any two countries (Raess et al., 2017). The instrument shows the political association between donors and recipient countries. A closer 
voting similarity pattern between a donor and a recipient country of aid shows that the recipient country shares the same political ideology with the 
donor. We used the UN voting similarities of four (Germany, Italy, France, and Japan) out of the top seven DAC contributing members to the 
World Bank aid. Our regression shows that these instruments impact education aid more in recipient countries. Likewise, the instruments passed 
all the instrument tests. The first stage of the 2sls is in Appendix Table A.1. Other top DAC members we did not use their UN voting similarities 
are the U.S., U.K., and Canada. These seven countries represent Western donors and ideology ((Bailey, Strezhnev, & Voeten, 2017; Dreher et al., 
2018a). 




2.3.2 Robustness checks 
  For more validity of our results, we provide three robustness checks to confirm whether 
our  results are sensitive to the choice of controls and data source. 
  First, in Table 2.9, we added another variable to further control for the institutional quality 
in the recipient countries. Thus, we substitute the Frazer freedom index for both trade as % of GDP 
and inflation rate (Gwartney et al., 2018).41 Though the results in Table 2.9 show that the World 
Bank education aid per capita is positive on all enrollment rates, the significance and estimated 
coefficients depends on enrollment rates and control variables included. The World Bank 
education aid per capita is weakly significant on enrollment rate primary education, but not 
significant on both  secondary, and tertiary enrollment rates.   
  Second, in Table 2.10, we account for other World Bank aid types as an additional control 
variable. We arrived at this by subtracting the education aid from the total aid, and we called this: 
other World Bank aid types.42 The results in Table 2.10 provide evidence that the World Bank 
education aid per capita is positive and on all enrollment rates (primary, secondary, and tertiary), 
but the estimated coefficients depend on enrollment rates and control variables. The World Bank 
education aid is significant only on enrollment rates primary and secondary education though it 
lost its significance on secondary enrollment rates as we add more controls. Results from both 
Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 support our prior results. 
  Next, we changed our dataset to OECD-DAC/CRS data and tested the effectiveness of the 
World Bank education aid per capita on educational outcomes in developing countries. This is a 
necessity for our paper's robustness because OECD-DAC/CRS is an alternative to AidData, and 
 
41 Trade and inflation are part of the variables used to construct the Frazer freedom index. The Frazer freedom index is the same as the Economic 
freedom index  
42 World Bank ODA – World Bank education aid =other World Bank aid types). 
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existing studies have tested the effectiveness of education aid on educational outcomes using the 
OECD-DAC/CRD dataset.43 The OECD-DAC/CRS show that from 2000-2014, the World Bank 
gives aid to 56 low- and middle-income developing countries as defined by (DAC 2016).44 We run 
similar estimations in our original AidData dataset on the OECD-DAC/CRS World Bank aid data. 
  We present the HT-IV estimation results of the OECD-DAC/CRS World Bank education 
aid in Table 2.11. The results show that the World Bank education aid per capita is positive on all 
enrollment rates. It is only significant in primary education enrollment rates in columns 1A and 
2A, but it lost significance as we add more controls in columns 3A and 4A. The World Bank 
education aid per capita is not significant in any of the columns for secondary and tertiary 
enrollment rates. These results support our prior findings that education aid per capita’s impact 
depends on both enrollment rates and control variables included.45 Again, it shows the result are 
sensitive to data source.  
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
 As the literature consensus shows, aggregate aid is not effective, but disaggregate aid by 
sector might improve welfare and reduce poverty in developing countries. In this paper, we use 
the relatively new and more comprehensive AidData database to examine the impact of the World 
Bank education aid on educational outcomes in developing countries.46 We find some evidence 
that education aid can improve enrollment rates in primary and secondary education, but this 
 
43 Previous studies had tested the effectiveness of education aid on educational outcomes using bilateral aid, not multilateral aid. 
44 It is worth mentioning that all the 56 recipients in the OECD-DAC/CRS dataset are also in the AidData dataset. 
45 For SAS version used and codes, see Appendix table B.1 
46 The World Bank provided the largest education aid in developing countries to improve educational outcomes between 2000-2014. The World 
Bank education aid between this period is 70 percent larger than that of the U.S. (the largest) ODA donor to developing countries (Strange et al., 
2017; USAID, 2020). Again, theoretically, the World Bank aid is more positioned to improve economic outcomes and reduce poverty in developing 
countries.   
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depends on the control variables included. The results also indicate that education aid does not 
improve tertiary education enrollment rates.  
 The results show that aid is endogenous. After controlling for aid endogeneity, the results 
are sensitive to the choice of controls and data source.47 Collectively, our results show that 
acknowledging 1) that aid varies by type and 2) the economic outcomes aid actually targeted, to a 
large extent, determined aid effectiveness. Our paper shows that education aid does not undeniably 
improve access to education during the period donors focused on providing education for all. 
Again, the actual effect of education aid depends on the level of education the aid is targeted. This 














47 That is the results are  not robust as the results from the robustness check confirm our earlier results that the effect of education aid per capita 
depends on enrollment rates, the control variables included, and the data source. 
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Table 2.1 List of all completed World Bank education aid projects in developing countries 
between 2000-2014. 
Number  Projects completed 
1 School infrastructure: construction of structurally safe school buildings and rehabilitation of existing buildings 
(in primary, secondary, and tertiary education); financing, build and equip new-model research universities. 
Furthermore, upgrade public educational facilities through civil works and supply of school furniture and 
equipment. 
2 Provision of computers; build and equip science laboratories, refurbish workshops, and provision of other school 
materials such as textbooks and instructional materials. 
3 . ICT training for students at all educational levels primary, secondary, and tertiary education. 
4 Training of teachers of primary and secondary education in rural and marginal urban communities. Teacher 
training includes an institutional development program consisting of fellowships practical training for teaching 
staff and in-service training for secondary teachers; reinforcement by inspection and counseling functions to 
upgrade skills. 
5 Finance educational research in post-secondary schools, which will include research grants and consultants to 
assist in designing research projects and for new course development. Sets up a competitive fund for scientific 
excellence that conducts scientific research, expands doctoral and post-doctoral training programs, and supports 
networking and outreach as well as special activities to promote scientific excellence. 
6 . Provide funds for policy analysis, monitoring, oversight and evaluation activities of school systems. It further 
provides funds to supports decentralization at the regional and school levels. 
7 Develop a new curriculum and enhanced learning assessment. 
8 Promotes readiness for learning through early childhood education. 
9 Increase access to kindergartens for the poor by providing kindergarten for children of age 5 in low-income areas. 
10 Improve access to education for all children of ages 7 to 15 by strengthening school-based management and 
community participation. 
11 Poverty-based scholarships awarded annually at public schools, which include scholarships for indigenous 
students. Again, it pays for students' school fees. E.g., the World Bank disburses block grants to all schools 
throughout Indonesia based on a per-student formula in 2005. This provides incentives for headmasters and 
teachers to focus on maintaining and increasing enrollment. 
12 Established a student loan program, redesigned any current stipend system, and provided school grants to eligible 
schools to implement school improvement plans. 













Table 2.2 (A) Sample of World Bank education aid. 
Project 
id 




























2003 2009 7 years 1.Construction of 
structurally safe school 
buildings, replace 
existing structural unsafe 
and overcrowded school 
buildings at both the 
primary and secondary 
education. 2. Provision 
of computers, building 
and equip science 
laboratories for 
secondary education. 3. 
Provide and increase 
access to Kindergarten 
for children of age 5, 
especially children of the 
poor, foster parent and 
community 
participation—to prepare 
kindergarten children for 
primary education. 
 
  (B) After we split the data by the project length, this project becomes: 
Project id Recipient Sector name Year Average project 

























































Table 2.2B: shows that the amount $144,154,869.7 in Table 1A, is split into 7 equal parts according to the project length (2003 to 
















North Africa No 
South and 
Central Asia No 











Liberia 39 Algeria* 48 Afghanistan 59 Cambodia 70 
Costa 





Rep. 49 Bangladesh 60 Indonesia 71 Jamaica 75 Brazil 82 Georgia 
3 Botswana* 23 Malawi 41 Iran* 50 India 61 Lao PDR 72 Mexico 76 Colombia 83 Turkey 
4 Burundi 24 Mali 42 Iraq 51 Kazakhstan 62 Malaysia 73 St. Lucia 77 Ecuador   
5 Cabo Verde 
25 
Mauritania 43 Jordan 52 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 63 Mongolia   78 Guyana   





Mozambique 45 Morocco 54 Nepal 65 Philippines   80 
Venezuela
, RB   
8 Chad 28 Namibia 46 Tunisia 55 Pakistan 66 Thailand       





Nigeria   57 Tajikistan 68 Tonga       
11 Congo, Rep. 31 Rwanda   58 Uzbekistan 69 Vanuatu       
12 Djibouti 32 Senegal             
13 Eritrea 33 Sierra Leone             
14 Ethiopia 
34 South 
Africa*             
15 Gabon* 35 Tanzania             
16 Ghana 36 Togo             
17 Guinea 37 Uganda             
18 Guinea-Bissau 38 Zimbabwe             
19 Kenya               
20 Lesotho               
All the above listed developing countries received both World Bank aid and World Bank education aid between 2000-2014 except the six asterisks who only received other types of  
World Bank aid but did not receive World Bank education aid. That is, out of the 83 developing countries, 77 countries received both World Bank aid and World Bank education 




Table 2.4 Summary Statistics. 
 Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
General Enrollment Primary 1245 103.852 15.760 72.903 136.362 
General Enrollment Secondary 1245 57.942 27.263 6.035 126.244 
General Enrollment Tertiary 1245 16.456 15.099 0.145 58.419 
lead3 General Enrollment Primary 1245 83.925 44.117 0 136.362 
lead3 General Enrollment Secondary 1245 48.011 33.739 0 120.327 
lead3 General Enrollment Tertiary 1245 14.057 15.581 0 58.419 
World Bank Education aid (per capita) 1245 1.294 3.942 0 96.296 
Ln World Bank Education aid (per 
capita) 
1245 0.513 0.643 0 4.578 
Government Expenditure on Education 
(% of total government expenditure) 
1125 15.789 6.330 1.118 32.090 
GDP per capita 1245 2808.387 2766.686 194.169 9738.4 
GDP growth 1245 4.817 3.558 -3.446 13.108 
Urban Population (% of total) 1245 43.662 20.233 8.246 88.941 
Political Freedom Index 1245 4.096 1.549 1 7 
Trade (% of GDP) 1230 76.612 34.730 .167 166.875 
Inflation rate 1215 6.959 5.883 -7.628 20.447 
Other World Bank aid types 1245 205 4250 0 4380 
Ln other World Bank aid types 1245 16.187 5.625 0 22.200 
Ideal Points Distance from France 1221 2.022 0.469 0.027 3.462 
Ideal Points Distance from Germany 1221 1.653 0.481 0.014 3.040 
Ideal Points Distance from Italy 1221 1.559 0.465 0.013 2.901 
Ideal Points Distance from Japan 1221 1.288 0.443 0.012 2.658 
 


















Table 2.5 Collinearity Diagnostics. 
Independent Variables VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
World Bank education aid per capita 1.02 1.01 0.9762 0.0238 
Government Expenditure on Education 1.04 1.02 0.9655 0.0345 
GDP per capita  2.11 1.45 0.4729 0.5271 
GDP growth  1.06 1.03 0.9455 0.0545 
Urban population 1.89 1.37 0.5299 0.4701 
Political freedom index 1.20 1.10 0.8317 0.1683 
Trade (% of GDP) 1.22 1.11 0.8167 0.1833 
Inflation rate 1.04 1.02 0.9638 0.0362 
Other World Bank aid types 1.27 1.13 0.7882 0.2118 
Mean VIF 1.32    
VIF of 1 means no correlation among a predictor and other predictor variables, VIFs of 4 call for concern, VIFs of 10 and above 
are signs of serious multicollinearity. The VIFs in our predictor variables range between 1 and 2.11.   Again, according to the 







Table 2.6 The impact of World Bank education aid per capita on educational outcomes. Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  Lead3_Gross enrollment: Primary  Lead3_ Gross enrollment: Secondary  Lead3_ Gross enrollment: Tertiary 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
Ln World Bank Education 

























































































































Government Expenditure on 
Education 












Trade (% of GDP)     -0.251*** 
(0.082) 
    -0.070 
(0.054) 
    -0.025 
(0.022) 
























Hausman Test   213.62 323.23 278.39 273.74  240.18 258.96 238.96 236.92  136.52 131.48 127.58 125.60 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Robust Hausman Test  63.475 160.150 141.030 149.137  113.728 241.196 233.100 227.485  56.146 80.278 82.109 89.046 
P value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared   0.141 0.234 0.244 0.245  0.134 0.154 0.167 0.167  0.043 0.050 0.053 0.054 
Observations  1,245 1,245 1,110 1,095  1,245 1,245 1,110 1,095  1,245 1,245 1,110 1,095 
Number of Countries  83 83 74 73  83 83 74 73  83 83 74 73 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. This model specification is consistent with the education aid 








Table 2.7 The impact of World Bank education aid per capita on educational outcomes in only 62  countries without outliers in the 
World Bank education aid. Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  Lead3_Gross enrollment: Primary  Lead3_ Gross enrollment: Secondary  Lead3_ Gross enrollment: Tertiary 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 


























































































































Government Expenditure on 
Education 












Trade (% of GDP)     -0.253*** 
(0.086) 
    -0.078 
(0.057) 
    -0.024 
(0.023) 
























Hausman Test   149.81 219.32 189.37 186.00  168.84 184.20 168.10 165.37  104.18 101.06 98.06 96.27 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Robust Hausman Test  51.554 128.729 126.026 137.189  85.122 173.984 174.743 183.942  42.312 46.226 55.157 58.729 
P value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared   0.132 0.210 0.230 0.231  0.130 0.148 0.166 0.165  0.050 0.053 0.056 0.057 
Observations  930 930 840 825  930 930 840 825  930 930 840 825 
Number of Countries  62 62 56 55  62 62 56 55  62 62 56 55 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. This model specification is consistent with the education aid 







Table 2.8  Cross section IV results of the impact of World Bank education aid per capita on educational outcomes. 
2SLS 
  % Change in primary enrollment rates   % Change in secondary enrollment rates  % Change in tertiary enrollment rates 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
Total education aid per capita 









































































Average political freedom 
index 


















% Change in urban 
population  






























 % Change in government 
expenditure on education 












% Change in Trade (% of 
GDP) 
    0.023 
(0.070) 
    0.232 
(0.234) 
    0.131 
(0.727) 
























F Statistic  27.47 9.68 14.94 12.43  27.47 9.68 14.94 12.43  27.47 9.68 14.94 12.43 
P value   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sanderson- Windmeijer (SW) 
(Chi-sq (3) 
 119.99 43.42 70.20 59.49  119.99 43.42 70.20 59.49  119.99 43.42 70.20 59.49 
(SW) P val  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J Statistic  5.678 2.135 3.310 3.335  9.633 5.127 5.509 5.445  4.802 2.848 2.912 2.929 
Chi -sq(2) P- val   0.128 0.545 0.346 0.343  0.022 0.163 0.1381 0.142  0.187 0.416 0.405 0.403 
R-squared  0.406 0.917 0.233 0.140  0.179 0.247 0.052 0.187  0.011 0.132 0.122 0.114 
Observations (Number of 
Countries) 
 83 83 74 73  83 83 74 73  83 83 74 73 
Robust standard errors by country are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The F statistics of the first stage in all regressions 
are sufficiently high (between 9.68 and 27.47). For column 4 (A, B, and C), the first stage  F statistic of 12.43 exceeds the Stock and Yogo critical values for maximal IV relative 
bias at the ten percent level (10.27). The Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage chi-squared and F statistics tests for under-identification and weak identification, respectively, of 
individual endogenous regressors. We reject the null hypothesis that our endogenous variable is under-identified. The test further shows that our instruments are strong. Furthermore, 
the results from the Sargan-Hansen test: which is a test of overidentifying restrictions, show that we fail to reject the joint Null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. 
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Table 2.9 Robustness check one: the impact of World Bank education aid per capita on educational outcomes with an additional 
institutional quality index as control. Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  Lead3_Gross enrollment: Primary  Lead3_ Gross enrollment: Secondary  Lead3_ Gross enrollment: Tertiary 
  (1A) (2A) (3A)  (1B) (2B) (3B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) 




























































































Government Expenditure on 
Education 
   -0.250 
(0.332) 
   0.029 
(0.217) 
   -0.086 
(0.093) 


















Hausman Test   213.62 286.16 261.44  240.18 247.76 241.23  136.52 134.11 137.70 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Robust Hausman Test  63.475 150.619 125.977  113.728 256.087 244.212  56.146 155.844 143.931 
P value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared   0.141 0.250 0.251  0.134 0.172 0.182  0.043 0.065 0.072 
Observations  1,245 1,065 975  1,245 1,065 975  1,245 1,065 975 
Number of Countries  83 71 65  83 71 65  83 71 65 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. In table 7, we control for additional institutional quality by 
substituting trade and inflation rate in the original model with the Economic freedom index (Frazer freedom index). 
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Table 2.10 Robustness check two: the impact of World Bank education aid per capita on educational outcomes with other World 
Bank’s aid types as an additional control. Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  Lead3_Gross enrollment: Primary  Lead3_ Gross enrollment: Secondary  Lead3_ Gross enrollment: Tertiary 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
Ln World Bank Education 



















































































































































Government Expenditure on 
Education 












Trade (% of GDP)     -0.265*** 
(0.083) 
    -0.083 
(0.054) 
    -0.033 
(0.022) 
























Hausman Test   215.56 324.66 279.26 273.93  245.62 263.33 243.39 245.03  146.98 139.35 135.60 136.93 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 
Robust Hausman Test  61.564 158.334 136.917 143.986  112.913 248.990 245.788 234.546  64.444 87.506 90.556 91.347 
P value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared   0.143 0.236 0.246 0.247  0.139 0.158 0.171 0.171  0.052 0.058 0.064 0.065 
Observations  1,245 1,245 1,110 1,095  1,245 1,245 1,110 1,095  1,245 1,245 1,110 1,095 
Number of Countries  83 83 74 73  83 83 74 73  83 83 74 73 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. In Table 9, we add other types of aid by the World Bank (World 





Table 2.11 Robustness check three: the impact of World Bank education aid per capita on educational outcomes with OECD-
DAC/CRS dataset  Annual data (2000-2014).  
HT-IV 
  Lead3_Gross enrollment: Primary  Lead3_ Gross enrollment: Secondary  Lead3_ Gross enrollment: Tertiary 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
Ln World Bank Education Aid 

























































































































Government Expenditure on 
Education 












Trade (% of GDP)     -0.231*** 
(0.088) 
    -0.039 
(0.050) 
    -0.009 
(0.017) 
























Hausman Test   121.13 188.17 183.71 181.98  161.37 169.70 172.06 169.00  70.34 84.65 79.86 78.69 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Robust Hausman Test  47.852 98.107 108.800 1111.494  48.593 90.061 122.174 117.550  16.557 29.766 35.324 35.467 
P value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared   0.129 0.221 0.248 0.249  0.120 0.130 0.166 0.166  0.040 0.047 0.065 0.065 
Observations  840 840 780 765  840 840 780 765  840 840 780 765 
Number of Countries  56 56 52 51  56 56 52 51  56 56 52 51 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. This model specification is consistent with the education aid 





Figure 2.1 World Bank total aid  by year and country for 83 countries (2000-2014). 
(A) World Bank total aid only by year for 83 developing countries. 



















Figure 2.2 World Bank education aid by year and country for 83 country (2000-2014). 
(A) World Bank education aid by year for 83 developing countries.  
















Figure 2.3 World Bank education aid by year and country for 62 countries (2000-2014). 
(A) World Bank education aid by year for 62 developing countries.  

















Figure 2.4 Average enrollment rates in the 83 developing countries (2000-2014). 
(A) Average enrollment rates (Primary education). 
(B) Average enrollment rates (Secondary education). 
(C) Average enrollment rates (Tertiary education). 
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ARE SPECIFIC TYPES OF AID MORE EFECTIVE ACROSS DIFFERENT DONORS? 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The impact of aid in the literature is mixed. Some studies provide evidence that aid works. 
Aid reduces income inequality (Chong et al., 2009).48 It has a positive long-run effect on growth, 
thereby improving welfare (Juselius, Framroze, and Tarp, 2014; Guillaumont & Wagner, 2014). 
However, others contend that aid is harmful. It crowds out both government revenue and public 
borrowing. It discourages and slows market-oriented policy, thereby strengthen government at the 
expense of the private sector, leading to more rent-seeking and corruption (Ross, 2001; Heckelman 
and Knack, 2005;2008; Bakhtiari et al., 2013; Dijkstra, 2018: Dutta, Fakutiju, & Williamson, 
2019).  According to  Doucouliagos and Paldam (2011), Nowak-Lehman et al. (2012), and 
Bjornskov (2014), the converging consensus in the literature is pointing to the claim that the overall 
effect of aggregate aid, the total official development assistance (ODA), on growth is zero.49 
 
48 Though the authors do not find robust evidence of the effect of aid on income inequality. 
49 According to the OECD (2021) definition, Official Development Assistance (ODA) has two components. First, the ODA grant: this is a financial 
resource provided to developing countries where the funds are free of interest and no provision for repayment. Second, an ODA loan which is a 
soft loan and has to be repaid with interest, but the interest rate is significantly lower than borrowing from commercial banks. Thus, sometimes, 
some very few negative numbers can be generated as aid through Debt cancellation or debt rescheduling/refinancing, categorized as new ODA 




Recent studies have shown that the effect of aid depends on aid type (Clemens et al., 2012; 
Bjornskov, 2014; Gopalan and Rajan, 2016). Others claim that donor types matter to aid 
effectiveness (Dreher et al., 2017; 2019a). As such, this paper examines whether specific types of 
aid are more effective across different donors.  
The aid literature provides three main reasons why the converging consensus points to an 
overall zero growth impact of aid. First, aid has a minimal impact to the extent that econometric 
problems prevent clear identification (Roodman, 2008). Again, it might have a positive impact but 
with numerous adverse unintended consequences resulting in a net effect of zero (Bjornskov, 
2014). Second, aid might cause Dutch Disease (Fielding and Gibson, 2012). The sudden inflows 
of aid do strengthen the local currency, making exports expensive and imports become cheaper, 
thereby weakening competitiveness, and negatively affecting production (Bjerg, Bjornskov, and 
Holm, 2011; Fielding and Gibson, 2012). Likewise, sudden large aid inflows without a 
corresponding increase in productivity lead to inflation. It might also lead to aid fungibility. This 
is when the government uses aid money to fund what might clearly be funded by the budget. In 
all, aid leading to Dutch disease and aid fungibility might distort the economy and leads to 
unintended negative outcomes (Dijkstra, 2018). 
Third, aid is given for diverse purposes. The extent of the diversity of aid can make 
identification of aid effects practically impossible if all the aid types are lumped together. Thus, 
the focus should be on the impact of aid types instead of aggregate aid (Wright and Winters, 2010; 
Bjornskov, 2014).50 Studies that have examined types of aid show that if aid is channeled properly 
to specific types of aid, it can have some direct positive outcomes in developing countries. Aid can 
 
50 Therefore, to resolve the difficulty in examining the impact of  aid in the literature, examining types of the aid offer the best solution. Examining 
types of aid also make it easier to trace aid fungibility (Michaelowa, 2004; Bjornskov, 2014). 
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be channeled to developing countries in three major ways: monetary transfer, conditionality, and 
knowledge transfer (Dutta and Williamson, 2016a). 
Direct money transfer can help supplement the government’s budget, and donors giving 
aid money to a specific type of aid can help achieve a specific development purpose (economic, 
social, and infrastructure). For instance, donors can direct aid money towards economic purposes 
by using the money to complete projects related to economic growth, such as water supply and 
sanitation projects, health projects, agriculture, and food sustainability projects. Donors can also 
use the aid money to complete projects related to infrastructure purposes, road construction, 
railways provision, and power generation. Similarly, donors can improve aid's effectiveness if aid 
is conditional on good macroeconomic policy and institutional quality in the recipient countries. 
Lastly, donors can provide knowledge transfer, training, and technical assistance to recipient 
countries. 
However, foreign aid can cause inefficiencies and corruption because it creates an 
alternative source of revenue (Ross, 2001). Specifically, the recipient government might use aid 
money to finance inefficient investment projects since aid weakens domestic accountability as 
compared to a government whose main revenue source is through taxation (Ross, 2001; Dutta, 
Fakutiju, and Williamson, 2019).  Likewise, some of the donor’s advice to the recipient countries, 
in the form of generating increased tax revenue and greater trade taxes, can hurt the people who 
are already low-income earners (Dutta, Fakutiju, and Williamson, 2019). In general,  aid is highly 
associated with mismanagement, inefficiencies, rent seeking, and corruption (Dutta and 




The following are some of the prominent studies on types of aid. Clemens et al. (2012) 
classify aid into early-impact aid (e.g., aid for infrastructure and industrial development) and 
longtime impact aid. The paper finds a significant effect of the early-impact aid on growth 
outcomes. Kilby and Dreher (2011) categorize aid to a needs-based category and an "other 
category." The authors argue that donors' motive determines aid's impact.  Rajan and Subramanian 
(2008) separate foreign aid according to donors, bilateral and multilateral aid. The paper finds no 
difference in the impact of both types of aid. Selaya and Thiele (2012) classify aid into program 
and project aid. The paper finds that program aid undermines governance. Thus, empirically, the 
impact of aid types is ambiguous.  
All the studies use the ad-hoc method of classifying aid into types. Their aid classifications 
are based on some form of intuitive theoretical arguments and not in a statistically valid way 
(Bjornskov, 2014). This is problematic because the literature provides strong evidence that 
considerable multicollinearity can create a lack of significance if specific aid types are not 
meaningfully separated (Roodman, 2007; Bjornskov, 2014). Therefore, aid dimensionalization or 
classification must be statistically valid (Bjornskov, 2014).  
Thus, according to Bjornskov (2014), his paper addressed the econometric problem 
emphasized by Roodman (2007). He used factor analysis to statistically dimensionalize all aid 
types into three main categories: aid for economic, social, reconstruction purposes.51 Thus, his 
paper addressed the problem of aid diversity, the dimensionality of aid, and the implication of 
treating aid as a multidimensional international transfer.52 He further claims that the real effect of 
 
51 Factor analysis, especially principal component analysis (PCA), is a data reduction method used to re-express multivariate (multidimensional) 
data into fewer interpretable dimensions or categories determined solely by the structure of the data. The main goal is that the fewer dimensions 
will capture maximum information (variation) from the original variables 
52Dimensionality here refers to the attributes of the aid data. Aid data comprises numerous aid types such as agriculture aid, industry aid, energy 
aid, communication aid, business aid, humanitarian aid,  water supply, and sanitation aid, education aid, health aid, and many others. Using factor 
analysis on the various aid types helps extract common and maximum variation from the original variables; it then grouped the common variation, 
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aid might be unobservable if makeshift categorization or classification mix types of aid’s actual 
effects with ineffective types. At the extreme, it might bias the estimated coefficients  towards zero 
(Bjornskov, 2014). His results provide evidence that only reconstruction aid improves growth, 
while economic and social aid has no impact on growth. 
However, these previous works have donor limitations. Bjornskov (2014) and earlier 
studies on aid types examine aid types by DAC (Development Assistance Committee) donors only, 
specifically the World Bank. These works did not examine the effect of specific types of aid across 
donors. The donor type, approach, and the implementation method become an issue in the literature 
and the media because the literature has shown that the effect of aid depends on donor type and its 
approach (Isaksson & Kotsadam, 2018; Gehring, Kaplan & Wong, 2019; Dreher et al., 2019a). 
Our paper builds from the previous studies on aid types and Bjornskov (2014)’s paper by 
using factor analysis to statistically classify all aid types into three major specific types: (1) 
economic, (2) social, and (3) infrastructure or construction aid across the three major aid donors 
(the World Bank, the U.S., and China). Thus, we examine (1) the effect of Chinese specific types 
of aid, and (2) compare the effect of Chinese specific types of aid to that of the U.S. and the World 
Bank specific types of aid using both recently available AidData and USAID database. That is, 
our paper seeks to compare the specific types of aid of a non-traditional, non-DAC member (China) 
to a traditional multilateral donor (World Bank) and a traditional DAC donor (the U.S). This 
comparison is necessitated, as the literature has shown that aid effectiveness can vary by type of 
donor (Palagashvili and Williamson 2018). Thus, to make aid more effective, OECD-DAC 
attaches soft rules to aid disbursement. 
 
thereby giving us fewer dimensions or classifications. For instance, in our paper, after applying factor analysis on all the aid types, it gives us three 
main categories, which we named economic, social, and infrastructure aid. 
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These soft rules are set standards that DAC- donors are expected to meet as foreign aid 
best practices. Palagashvili and Williamson (2018) categorize these best practices into 
transparency, reporting, and ability to monitor donor behavior, low overhead costs, aid 
specialization, recipient selectivity, and use of effective delivery. China does not follow these best 
practices, except for low overhead costs (Brautigam, 2009; 2010; Dreher et al., 2017). Meanwhile, 
Chinese foreign aid to developing countries has increased tremendously since 2000 (Kitano and 
Harada, 2016). Therefore, investigating the impact of Chinese aid relative to traditional donors is 
crucial to understanding aid effectiveness. 
  China is not part of the traditional donors and is not a member of DAC (Tan-Mullins, 
Mohan, & Power, 2010).  China, as a donor, operates a policy of no interference. China gives aid 
without minding the macroeconomic environment and institutional quality of the recipients' 
countries (Dreher et al., 2018a). Furthermore, Chinese aid is rooted in its domestic political 
interests and is linked to its commerce interests (Cheng et al., 2012; Aydin and Tekin, 2015). This, 
coupled with China's sudden rise as a major donor has helped fuel an ongoing debate and concern 
both in the literature and in the media that China as an aid donor hurts developing countries' 
economies rather than promoting economic development. China's approach to aid is not 
transparent, and it is poorly understood (Brautigam, 2009). Furthermore, there is a lack of 
comprehensive data on Chinese aid, which has created a research gap. Therefore, the media calling 
China a "rogue donor" guided only by self-interest is not a misplaced apprehension (Zafar, 2007). 
All these factors make the concern about the impact of Chinese aid justifiable (Brautigam, 2010; 
Dreher et al., 2018a). 
On the other hand, China not following the laid down rules of OECD/DAC members in 
giving aid shows that China represents and introduces an alternative approach to poverty reduction 
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in recipient countries. China also represents a new challenge to traditional donors—who stress aid 
conditionality and set standards in giving aid (Husain, 2017). Specifically, China is faster at getting 
things done. China complete aid projects faster than the traditional donors. This corroborates 
policymakers' observations in developing countries who claim that China is faster and more 
efficient at implementing social and economic projects than its Western counterparts (Soule-
Kohndou, 2016; Dreher et al., 2017).  
Not all studies share this view. Some argue that as a donor, China finances low-cost and 
substandard projects, and it may have prioritized speed over quality by financing substandard 
constructions and white elephant projects (Dreher et al., 2017). For instance, roads that wash away 
due to low quality and hospitals without equipment or personnel. Meanwhile, western donors 
might have been implementing projects in careful and sustainable ways due to long years of 
experience (Dreher et al., 2017). Thus, theoretically, the impact of Chinese aid is ambiguous.  
  Likewise, empirically, there is no consensus on the effect of Chinese aid in the literature. 
These studies find that China's ODA promotes growth and does not reduce the effectiveness of the 
World Bank aid (Guloba, Kilimani, & Nabiddo, 2010; Dreher et al., 2017). Chinese transportation 
projects reduce economic inequality within and between subnational localities (Dreher et al., 
2018b). However, Gehring, Kaplan & Wong (2019) find that Chinese aid is associated with more 
government repression, while the World Bank aid projects do not. Chinese aid encourages local 
corruption, but the World Bank aid projects stimulate local economic activity without fueling local 
corruption (Isaksson & Kotsadam, 2018).53 Therefore, our paper attempts to resolve the ambiguity 
in foreign aid effectiveness between DAC- donor members and non-DAC donors.   
 
53 These studies further show the conflicting impact of Chinese aid. Dreher et al. (2019b) find that allocating Chinese aid towards the home regions 
of recipient country leaders does not reduce its effectiveness. Meanwhile, in another study, Dreher et al. (2019a) provide evidence that Chinese aid 
shows a pattern of political favoritism in the spatial distribution, while the World Bank development projects do not. 
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  Thus, we seek to fill the research gap by analyzing the effect of Chinese specific types of 
aid on economic growth and compare Chinese aid effectiveness to the World Bank and the U.S.’s 
specific types of aid on growth outcomes. The analysis also investigates aid interdependency 
between the three donors by analyzing if Chinese specific types of aid are substitutes or 
complements of the World Bank or the U.S’ specific types of aid. 
  We build from previous studies by using the relatively new AidData database. This 
database is becoming a standard alternative to OECD data because it provides a more 
comprehensive account of global ai flows for both DAC members such as the World Bank and 
Non-DAC members such as China. 
  These three main categories of aid: economic aid, social aid, and infrastructure aid, are our 
variables of interest. The aid data for both the World Bank and China is collected from the AidData 
database (Goodman et al., 2019). The aid figures include only completed projects for both the 
World Bank and China. The U.S. aid data is collected from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development database (USAID, 2020).  
           Our measure of economic growth is GDP per capita growth, the annual percentage. The 
data is collected from the World Bank development indicators (WDI, 2017). This growth 
measurement is based on aid literature (Bjornskov,  2014; Dreher et al., 2017).   
  According to the literature, aid is endogenous. The economic features of recipient countries 
may concurrently influence growth outcomes and aid allocation. Likewise, growth outcomes do 
correlate with other development outcomes such as income, education attainments, and mortality 
rate. Therefore, omitted variable bias is another source of aid’s endogeneity. (Dutta & Williamson 
2016a; Dreher et al., 2019). We follow the previous aid literature and instrument for aid types with 
exogenous variables (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Dreher et al., 2018b). Therefore, we use both the 
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time demeaning transformation of our endogenous variables (economic, social, and infrastructure 
aid) and that of the exogenous variables as instruments (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 327; Greene, 2018, 
p.430).54 
 Our results provide evidence that the growth effects of specific types of aid depend on the 
aid type. All the aid types are positive irrespective of the donor, though only the U.S. aid types 
show some improvements in economic growth in recipient countries. Again, our results show that 
Chinese economic aid is a complement of the World Bank economic aid. Our results also indicate 
that Chinese social aid and the World Bank social aid are both substitutes. Finally, countries 
receiving aid from the three donors at once do not make aid more effective. This shows that more 
aid does not necessarily (or not always) translate to better growth outcomes. These results are 
robust to controlling for the log of GDP per capita, investment rate, government expenditure (% 
of GDP), democracy (institutional quality), life expectancy rate, durable (political stability), the 
log of disaster (number of people affected), and openness (trade % of GDP). 
 
3.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.2.1 Main data  
We use project-level data as reported by AidData.org and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID).55 AidData.org provides comprehensive data of both the Chinese and the 
World  Bank’s aid types from 2000-2014. It is the only database available on Chinese aid and is 
only available from 2000-2014: this limits our dataset to this time frame. Likewise, USAID 
provides comprehensive data on the U.S. types of aid. The provision of a more detailed account of 
 
54 The” time-demeaning transformation” of an endogenous variable is truly exogenous and a valid instrument for that endogenous variable as it 
does not correlate with any of the error terms (μi or eit). It only correlated with the endogenous variable. 
55 Thanks to Seth Goodman at AidData.org for providing the data. 
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global aid flows by AidData makes it become a standard alternative to OECD/ World Bank data 
(Nielsen et al., 2011; Bjornskov, 2014). According to the AidData database, the World Bank has 
13 purpose codes, each representing a type of aid. The Chinese aid data has 24 purpose codes 
(Goodman et al., 2019). Similarly, USAID data provides comprehensive data of  U.S types of aid 
with 26 types of aid (USAID, 2020). Both datasets existing dimensionality makes it easier to 
classify the different aid types in a statistically valid way.   
 Figures from AidData show that between 2000-2014 the World Bank provide aid to 143 
countries and completed 5,532 ODA projects with $407.75billion. China provide aid to 120 
countries and completed 4,072 ODA projects with $59billion.56 Likewise, USAID data show that 
the U.S. provides aid to 204 countries and completed 45,350 ODA projects with $398. 61billion 
within the same period.57 The World Bank aid's project length is 1 to 16 years, while for Chinese 
aid, the project length is 1 to 12 years. For the U.S. aid, the project length is 1 to 26 years. For each 
donor, we split the actual amount disbursed per project by the project length. For instance, if a 
project’s duration is seven years, we spread the amount spent on that project into the seven-year 
duration: therefore, we have the average amount spent on each per year by each donor. 58 
These figures show that each donor completed various and different aid projects cutting 
across all the aid types between 2000-2014. Thus, to correctly classify and reduce all the aid types, 
 
56 Our paper includes only projects officially marked implementation or completion in the status column. Meanwhile, projects marked as a pledge, 
pipeline, suspended, or canceled are excluded from our dataset. This is consistent with the literature and AidData. The World bank aid data have 
both commitment and disbursement columns. Thus, we use the disbursement amount, but when the disbursement amount is missing, and the project 
is marked implementation or completion, we fill in the commitment value. We analyze the dataset at the national level using the country name as 
recipients and include only project aid given to specific countries, thus exclude regional aid that cannot be assigned to one country.  
57 The U.S. aid is categorized as either disbursed or obligation. Our data include only the actual disbursed amount as obligations might not be 
fulfilled. Again, all aid amount from the U.S. is $452billion, but to be comparable to other donors, we only selected U.S projects aid which is 
$398.61billion. 
58 We provide an example of a specific recipient in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. 
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from each donor, into fewer interpreted categories, we use factor analysis, especially PCA 
(principal component analysis).59 
Our paper follows the aid literature and strictly applies the PCA process to all the aid types 
for each of the donors (separately) in our dataset. Therefore, for each of the donors, we arrived at 
three components (or factors) with eigenvalues above one.60 The three components explained 94, 
96, and 90 percent variations in the data for China, the World Bank, and the U.S aid types, 
respectively. We renamed each of the three components according to their loadings on each aid 
type for each donor. Our paper does not use the factor scores because the factor scores might be 
challenging to interpret quantitatively (Bjornskov, 2014). This means we only use the PCA results 
to recategorize our original aid types data into economic, social, and infrastructure aid. 
That is, any of the three components that load substantially on aid directed towards the 
overall purpose of productive investment is named economic aid. The component that loads 
considerably on aid, which is directed towards non-pecuniary social development through 
government policy is termed social aid. Any component that loads largely on aid directed towards 
industry, mining, transport, and energy is referred to as infrastructure aid (Bjornskov, 2014). The 
remaining percentage of each type of aid (for each donor) not loaded on any of the three 
components is added as one and called residual aid (Bjornskov, 2014). Therefore, after renaming 
each of the three components for each donor, we arrive at economic aid, social aid, and 
infrastructure for each donor (China, the World Bank, and the U.S.).61 We use annual data, it shows 
 
59 Our main goal of using PCA is to be able to reduce our multidimensional aid types data into fewer and interpretable dimensions in a statistically 
valid way (Bjornskov, 2014, Greene, 2018, pp. 97-98). That is, PCA is applied on aid types for each donor separately. Thus, we arrived at a fewer 
classification of aid for each donor. 
60 Thus, the three factors (components ) or typologies, we retained, are entirely determined by the structure of the data for each donor. We further 
applied oblique rotation, on the three components retained, to get maximum factor weight loading on each component (Bjornskov, 2014). 
61Across the three donors, we noticed that a substantial part of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing and Food aid and health aid always loads on the 
same component for each of the donors. We rename this component as the economic aid for that donor irrespective of the component (either 1,2 or 
3). Again, we noticed both energy and industry, mining, and construction aid always load on the same component for each donor irrespective of 
the components for that donor. We rename this component infrastructure aid for that donor. Finally, any of the three components that do not have 
any loading of the aid types mentioned above or that loads substantially on some or all of the following aid types, trade and policy, emergency 
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a steady increase in aid from 2000-2014 (See Figures 3.1 to 3.4).62 and the three types of aid, 
economic, social, and infrastructure, are in log form. Also, we follow the literature, and allow for 
one-time lag between aid types and growth to adjust for the long-term impact of aid (Juselius, 
Framroze, and Tarp, 2014). Furthermore, because we have three donors, our paper includes only 
103 countries; these are countries that are a consistent recipient of aid across the three donors 
between 2000-2014 (see Table 3.3).63 
Our dependent variable and measure of economic growth outcome is GDP per capita 
growth annual percentage. The data is collected from the World Bank development indictors 
(World Bank, 2017). This measure of economic growth is strictly according to the literature on aid 
(Bjornskov, 2014; Dreher et al., 2017).  
 The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3.4. The World Bank aid amount is in 2011 
USD. Chinese aid amount is in 2014 USD. Also, the U.S. aid amount is in constant values. As 
shown in the table, all the aid amounts are express in millions.64 
 
 
response aid, other multisector aid, administrative, and oversight are referred to as social aid for that donor.  Thus, the three aid types are comparable 
across the three donors, that is, china's economic aid,  the World Bank economic aid, and the U.S. economic aid are all comparable to one another. 
This is also true for both social and infrastructure aid. A detailed explanation of the PCA process, the factors weight loadings on the three retained 
factors  (components) with an eigenvalue above one for each donor is in Appendix D.  
62 Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, and Figure 3.3 show a steady increase in ODA by all the donors between 2000-2014. Likewise, Figure 3.4 shows that the 
U.S. infrastructure aid increases most during this period, followed by its economic aid. The U.S. social does not have much increase between 2000-
2014. Meanwhile, China's economic aid increase most during this period. There is not much difference between the increase in China's infrastructure 
and social aid.  Both the World Bank's economic and infrastructure aid have a steady increase between 2000-2014, while the World Bank social 
aid only picks up briefly in 2010, drops between 2011 and 2013 and pick up again in 2014. 
63 In the 103 consistent countries, the World Bank completed 4,425 ODA projects with $328.84billion. China completed 3,711 ODA projects with 
$48.45billion. While the U.S. completed 30,033 ODA projects with $316.13billion between 2000-2014. After using PCA on the aid types for each 
donor separately, we then selected the 103 consistent recipients of aid across the three donors for our analysis.  
64 As earlier mentioned, ODA includes both ODA grants and ODA loans. Thus, very few negative numbers can sometimes be generated as aid 
through Debt cancellation or debt rescheduling/refinancing, categorized as new ODA (DAC, 2020; OECD, 2021). Since aid includes both zero and 
a few negative values, we compute logs of aid as ln(1 + aid) Specifically, the ln aid was created as : x = ln(1 + (aid/1,000,000)). We use the linear 
trend formula to fix the missing values by country. for all the control variables and our dependent variable. For instance, if in 2006, a country’s 
GDP per capita is 1525.34, but its 2007 value is blank, while its 2008 GDP per capita is 1541.26, using the linear trend formula, its 2007 GDP per 
capita will be 1533.3. The variable is left blank for a country when there is not enough observation for a linear trend formula.  Furthermore, we 
find and replace the outliers for each variable with either the upper bound or the lower bound value for that variable. However, we do not apply 
these processes to  Disaster (total affected) since natural disaster does not usually follow a particular order. That is, the total number affected in a 
disaster depends on whether there is a disaster or not. Thus, if there is no disaster in a country in a particular year, the total number affected is zero. 
Likewise, we did not apply these processes to our aid types. Our data and the methodology section offer a comprehensive explanation of how we 
treated all the aid variables by donors. Table 3.4 also shows that the residual aid is high (this is the aid not meant for any development purpose). 






3.2.2 Econometric analysis  
We estimate the following regression equation:  
yit =  x1it-1′ β1  +  x2it-1′ β2  +  μi  +  εit-1 (3.1) 
 
From the equation above, yit is GDP per capita growth rate for county i at time t. x1it-1 is k1 
(exogenous) covariates that are time-varying and uncorrelated with μi. x2it-1 is k2 endogenous 
explanatory variables (aid types from each donor) that are time-varying and correlated with μi. The 
μi is the country-specific random term, and it contains the unobserved individual effects. Finally, 
εit-1 is the error term and t-1 denote the previous year to account for the long-term impact of aid. 
The model described above is the Hausman Taylor instrumental variable estimator (HT-IV). 
Hausman Taylor has proposed an instrumental variables estimator that uses only information 
within the model (that did not incorporate any outside instruments). The rationale is applying fixed 
effects transformation (also known as within transformation) to the data and using the resulted data 
as instruments for the original variables. This is called the  Hausman Taylor Instrumental Variable 
approach (HT-IV). Specifically, HT-IV takes deviations from the group means, then subtract this 
from the original equation (equation 3.1). That is:   
yit - y̅i  = (x1it-1 - x̅1i)′ β1 + (x2it-1 - x̅2i)′ β2 + εit-1 - ε̅i   where  
y᷉it ≡ yit - y̅i , x᷉1it-1 ≡ x1it-1 - x̅1i , x᷉2it-1 ≡ x2it-1 - x̅2i , and ε᷉it-1 ≡ εit-1 - ε̅i    
 
(3.2) 
Thus, this within transformation to deviations from group means removes from the model 
the part of the disturbance that is correlated with x2it-1. According to Wooldridge (2002, p 327), 
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Greene (2018, p.430), the newly generated explanatory variables x᷉2it-1 are truly exogenous and 
valid instruments for x2it-1 (our endogenous variables).65 Furthermore, x᷉1it-1 serve as instruments 
for x1it-1. Thus, the instruments for equation 3.1 are x᷉1it-1 and  x᷉2it-1.66 
 In selecting the covariates,  we closely follow previous literature. In line with Gomanee et 
al. (2005),  Clemens et at. (2012), and Bjornskov (2014),  we include the following: GDP per 
capita, which reflects the poverty situation (or income levels) in the recipient country (Gomanee 
et al., 2005; Clemens et al., 2012; Bjornskov, 2014). Gross capital formation (as % of GDP) control 
for investment rate, while government final consumption expenditure (as % of GDP) control for 
government expenditure in the recipient country (Bjornskov, 2014). We also include the life 
expectancy rate, which represents the health status indicator. It is a measure of living standard and 
improve-lifestyle in the recipient country (Bjornskov, 2014). Openness (Trade as a % of GDP) 
accounts for the likelihood that aid is given to countries with reasonable economic policies. All 
are from the World Bank development indicators (WDI, 2017). 
 Some aid is given as humanitarian aid during emergencies and disasters. Therefore, disaster 
(total number affected per million) is added as a control for disaster in the recipient country 
(Bjornskov, 2014). The data is collected from (EM-DAT 2018). Democracy index (polity2) control 
for institutional quality (Bjornskov, 2014). According to Dutta and Williamson, 2016a; Bjornskov, 
2014), Polity IV's polity2 variable is a robust measure of democracy indicator developed by 
Cheibub, Gandhhi, and Vreeland (2010). The polity2 dataset ranks countries' years on an index 
 
65 That is the time demeaning transformation for each aid type instrument for the original aid type for a particular donor. For instance, the time 
demeaning transformation of Chinese economic aid serves as the instrument for Chinese economic aid. Again, the time demeaning transformation 
of Chinese social aid instrument for Chinese social aid. Likewise, the time demeaning transformation of Chinese infrastructure aid instrument for 
Chinese infrastructure aid. This process is applied to all the other aid types for the other donors (the U.S. and the World Bank) separately. 
66This set of instruments are also valid if elements of  x2it are simultaneously determined with y1t (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 328). Likewise, our model 
does not need the test of overidentifying restrictions because this test is only required when the model has time-invariant endogenous variables, and 
our model does not include time-invariant endogenous variables (Wooldridge (2002, p 327), 
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ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to + 10 (strongly democratic).67 Therefore, polity2 captures 
democracy in order of increasing democracy in a country (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, 2010; 
Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, 2011; Bjornskov, 2014; Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, 2019). 
All the control variables mentioned above are the controls used by Bjornskov (2014). 
Our paper also includes a measure of political stability, durable (Dutta and Williamson, 
2016b). Durable captures the number of years since the most recent regime change, where regime 
refers to a country's political system, and regime change is a three-point change in the polity score 
in the past three years or less (Dutta and Williamson, 2016b; Marshall et al., 2019). Durable ranges 
from 0 to 205).68 Polity2 and durable are collected from Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2019).69 
Aid is endogenous to growth in developing countries (Dreher et al., 2017). The two sources 
of aid endogeneity are, First, reverse causation, the recipient economic features may influence both 
growth outcomes and foreign aid allocation at the same time. For instance, donors might provide 
more aid to poorer countries. Second, omitted variable bias, growth outcomes usually correlate 
with all other development outcomes, such as education attainments, and mortality rate 
(Bjornskov, 2014; Dutta and Williamson, 2016a; Dreher et al., 2017).70 Thus, taking the potential 
endogeneity of aid into account, we employ the Hausman Taylor instrumental variable (HT-IV) 
estimator (Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 299-328; Greene, 2018, pp. 427-431). As stated above, HT-IV 
uses the time demeaning transformation of our endogenous variables (aid types) as instruments for 
the aid types (for each donor separately).71  
 
67 The range Is from -9 to + 10 in our dataset. 
68 It ranges from 0 to 41.5 in our dataset. 
69 the diagnostics (see Table 3.5) show that the variance inflation factors (VIF) of the variables are less than 2.9. 
70 Furthermore, donors' interests in a specific country, such as forming or rewarding political allies,  trade partnerships, access to natural resources,  
military alliances, or achieving the donor's foreign policy agenda, do correlate with aid leading to omitted variable bias. The U.S., as a donor,  is a 
Western developed country and it represents Western political ideologies. Likewise, the Western developed countries are the major financiers of 
the World Bank, thus to some extent, the World Bank’s aid allocation might reflect its financiers’ interests. However, China is not a Western 
country, and China always maintain contradictory positions to Western countries on international matters. Thus, each of the donor’s aid might 
reflects its interests.  
71 In the presence of endogeneity, OLS and RE results are biased and inconsistent. 
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Furthermore, to have a robust comparison of aid among the donors, our model requires 
several observations for each of the donors and their interactions. Thus, we use annual data rather 
than data average over some periods. Likewise, we account for the long-term impact of aid by 
lagging the explanatory variables by one year (Juselius, Framroze, and Tarp, 2014).72 
 
3.3 RESULTS 
3.3.1 Main results 
Table 3.6 to 3.18 presents the results of the impact of the donors’ (China, the U.S, and the 
World Bank) types of aid and their interaction effects in four columns for the Hausman Taylor 
estimator. In each column, we add the controls in order of importance. In column 1, we controlled 
for income levels (GDP per capita) and investment rate.  In column 2, we added controls for 
government expenditure and institutional quality (Democracy index). In column 3, we include 
additional controls for institutional quality (political stability), health status indicator (life 
expectancy), and disaster (total number affected). In column 4, trade as percent of GDP controlled 
for policy environment.73  
In all the tables, we report the interaction term of the types of aid by donors to test whether 
Chinese types of aid are substitutes or complements of either the U.S. or the World Bank types of 
aid.74 Chinese aid raises concern because China does not follow the set standard or donor's best 
practice in aid disbursement and implementation. That is, we investigate this hypothesis by 
creating interaction terms between (1) China and the U.S. types of aid, (2) China and the World 
 
72 After creating lag1 for all the control variables, it generates one blank space per country for each explanatory variable. Thus, we replaced the one 
blank space with zero for each explanatory variable (per country). 
73 All the controls  variables are for the recipient countries of aid. 
74 The results of the interaction term and the overall effects are reported in columns 1C, 2C, 3C, and 4C in all tables. 
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Bank types of aid, (3) the U.S. and the World Bank types of aid.75 (4) China, the U.S., and the 
World Ban types of aid. 
Specifically, we test whether aid performs better when a country receives two units of aid 
from a donor (China, the U.S, or the World Bank) than getting one unit of aid from each donor 
(China and the U.S. or China and the World Bank). Thus, we report and interpret the overall (joint) 
effect of when a country receives a unit of aid from two donors or three donors at the same 
time.76 We further examine whether more aid is better by examining the impact of when a country 
receives aid from all the donors at once. Finally, we examine the ODA from each donor and their 
interaction to further test whether more aid is better.77 The results of the Hausman tests are 
displayed in all the tables.78  
Table 3.6 presents the regression results for the impact of economic aid by China, the U.S., 
and the interaction term on growth in recipient countries. The results show that the Chinese 
economic aid (columns 1A to 4A) and the U.S. economic aid (columns 1B to 4B) have a positive 
impact on growth, but only the U.S. economic aid improves economic growth.79 The overall effect 
of receiving economic aid from both countries (from the interaction effects) is positive in columns 
(1C, 2C, 3C, and 4C) but not significant. Table 3.6 shows that in columns 1B, 2B, 3B, and 4B, a 
one percent increase in the U.S economic aid will lead to 0.0035, 0.0035, 0.0026, and 0.0027 
 
75 This test of the interaction effect of the U.S. and World Bank aid types is necessitated to know whether the effect is different or similar to that of 
China and the World Bank's interaction term. It also answers the question of whether bilateral aid has a similar impact on multilateral aid. 
76 The overall (joint) effect of when a country receives a unit of aid from two donors or the three donors at the same time, (1) China and the U.S.,(2) 
China and the World Bank., (3) the World Bank and the U.S., and (4) China, the U.S., and the World Bank are reported in their respective tables 
(Tables 3.6 to 3.18). For instance, in Table 3.6 column 1C: y= b1 + b2(lnChina) + b3(ln(U.S) + b4(lnChina*lnU.S) the overall effect of receiving 
both China and the U.S aid is y = 0.142*(1) + 0.346*(1) - 0.025(1*1) = 0.463. We compare this to when the country receives 2 units of aid from 
either China 0.142(2) = 0.284, or from the U.S. 0.346(2) =0.692. 
77 This test of whether more aid is better is necessitated to separate the donor effect of aid. That is, there is a high possibility that the interaction of 
aid from two donors might have a positive outcome due to more aid and not necessarily a donor effect. Thus, we test extensively if more aid is 
actually better. 
78 The results of the Hausman test show that in all regressions, the unobserved individual characteristics and the explanatory variables are correlated. 
Thus, using the HT-IV estimator approach to correct for this endogeneity is appropriate. 
79 The Chinese economic aid is significant in column 1A but loses significance as we add more controls in columns 2A, 3A, and 4A. Meanwhile, 
the U.S. economic aid is significant at a 1 percent level in all columns 1B to 4B. 
 
67 
percent increase in the recipient’s GDP per capita growth rate, respectively. Specifically, in 
column 4B, the economic importance is that given lag1(ln U.S. economic aid) mean level of 
exp(1.858), which is 6.411, a one percent increase in the U.S. economic aid ($64,110) will increase 
the recipient’s GDP per capita growth rate from 2.775 percent to 2.778 percent.80  
Table 3.7 reports the results of the effect of social aid by China, the U.S., and the interaction 
term on growth in recipient countries. The results indicate that the social aid by China (columns 
1A to 4A) and the U.S. social aid (columns 1B to 4B) are positive, but only the U.S. social aid is 
significant. The overall effect is positive (in columns 1C to 4C) but not significant. Table 3.7 
results show that a one percent increase in the U.S social aid will lead to 0.0039, 0.0040, 0.0031, 
and 0.0030 percent increase in GDP per capita growth in the recipient country, columns 1B, 2B, 
3B, and 4B, respectively. That is, a $39,510 increase in the U..S. social aid will increase the 
recipient’s GDP per capita growth rate from 2.775 to 2.778 (using column 4B).81  
Table 3.8 shows the results of the impact of infrastructure aid by China, the U.S., and the 
interaction term on growth in recipient countries. The results show that the infrastructure aid by 
China (columns 1A to 4A) and the U.S. infrastructure aid (columns 1B to 4B) are positive in all 
columns but not significant.82 Likewise, the overall effect (from the interaction term) is positive in 
columns (1C to 4C) but not significant. 
Table 3.9 presents the results of the effects of economic aid by China, the World Bank, and 
the interaction term on growth. The results reveal that the economic aid by China (in columns 1A 
 
80 The lag1(ln U.S. economic aid) mean level of exp(1.858) = 6.411. That is 6,411,000 (because all aid figures are reported in millions). Thus, a 
one percent increase in the U.S economic aid is $64,110. Again, the mean level of GDP per capita growth is 2.775. (Thus, 2.775% + 0.0027% = 
2.778%). Furthermore, in all regressions, we interpret the economic importance using column 4 in the respective tables because the result in column 
4 is the most conservative that’s column 4 has all the control variables.  
81 The mean level of the lag1(ln U.S. social aid) is exp(1.374) = 3.951. This is $3,951,000. Thus, a one percent increase is $39,510. Again, in 
column 4B, 2.775% + 0.0030% equal 2.778%. where 2.775% is the mean level of GDP per capita growth rate. 
82 Though the U.S. infrastructure aid is significant in column 1B, it becomes insignificant as we add more controls in columns 2B, 3B, and 4B. The 
Chinese infrastructure aid is not significant in any of the columns 1A to 4A. 
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to 4A) and the World Bank economic aid (columns 1B to 4B) are positive but not significant.83 The 
overall effect (from the interaction term) is positive and significant (columns 1C to 4C). A one 
percent increase in economic aid by both China and the World Bank will lead to a 0.0054, 0.0055, 
0.0049, and 0.0051 percent increase in GDP per capita growth rate when a country receives 
economic aid from both donors. This means that $45,630 receives by a country from both donors 
will increase its GDP per capita growth rate from 2.775 percent to 2.780 (column 4C).84 But, this 
represents more aid. Still using column 4C, we compare this overall effect to when a country 
receives two units of economic aid from either donor. For China, this is 0.464*2, which equals 
0.928 (that is 0.0093 percent), while for the World Bank, this is 0.189*2, which gives 0.378 (that 
is 0.0038 percent). This shows that Chinese economic aid is a complement of the World Bank 
economic aid. A country is better off receiving one unit of economic aid from both China and the 
World Bank than receiving two units of economic aid from the World Bank.85 This is plausible 
because China does take on enormous and challenging aid projects previously rejected by 
traditional donors and turn them to success.86 Thus, Chinese presence can act as catalysts for the 
World Bank to perform better or take on aid projects they previously taught impossible. Thus, 
Chinese economic aid can act as a complement to the World Bank economic aid. 
Table 3.10 shows the results of the impact of social aid by China, the World Bank, and the 
interaction term on economic growth. From the results, Chinese social aid (columns 1A to 4A) and 
 
83 Economic aid from each donor is significant in the first column (1A and 1B), but as we add more controls, it became insignificant in the rest of 
the columns (2A to 4B). 
84 The mean level of lag1_(ln China economic aid * ln World Bank economic aid) is exp(1.518) = 4.563. That is, $4,563,000. Thus, a one percent 
increase is $45,630. Again, 2.775% + 0.0051% = 2.7801. 
85 But a country is better off receiving two units of economic aid from China than receiving one unit from each donor.   
86 This is evidence in the case of TAZARA (an 1860-kilometer railway connecting Tanzania and Zambia) in the early 1960s. The World Bank, the 
U.S., and other DAC member donors previously rejected this project after two feasibility studies by the World Bank concluded that technically and 
economically, the project is not feasible. China decided to finance the US$3 billion in current dollars with an extraordinary engineering challenge. 
The project was a success, and it was completed before the set deadline. This singular project opens up both countries' economies (Tanzania and 
Zambia) to rapid development by connecting rural agrarian production to urban markets (Dreher et al., 2018b). Although this aid project is not 




the World Bank social aid (column 1B to 4B) do not improve economic growth.87 The overall 
effect is positive and significant (columns 1C to 4C).  A one percent increase in social aid by both 
donors will lead to a 0.0037, 0.0037, 0.0033, and 0.0036 percent increase in the recipient’s GDP 
per capita growth rate. Thus, a $35,180 receives by a country from both donors will increase its 
GDP per capita growth rate to 2.779 percent (column 4C).88 We compare this overall effect to 
when a country receives two units of social aid from either donor (column 4C). We find that 
Chinese social aid and the World Bank social aid are substitutes.89 
  Table 3.11 displays the results of the effect of infrastructure aid by China, the World Bank, 
and the interaction term on growth. The results indicate that infrastructure aid by China (columns 
1A to 4A) and the World Bank infrastructure aid (columns 1B to 4B) are positive but not 
significant.90  Likewise, the overall effect (from the interaction term) is positive in all columns 1C 
to 4C but not significant. 
Table 3.12 shows the results of the economic aid by the U.S., the World Bank, and the 
interaction effect on economic growth. From the columns, the U.S. economic aid (columns 1A to 
4A) and the World Bank economic aid (columns 1B to 4B) is positive, but only the U.S. economic 
aid is significant.91 Likewise, the overall effect (columns 1C to 4C) is positive but not  significant. 
Table 3.13 presents the results of the social aid by the U.S., the World Bank, and the 
interaction effect. The results show that the U.S. social aid (columns 1A to 4A) and World Bank 
 
87 The estimated coefficients are all positive, but none is significant (columns 1A to 4B). 
88 The mean value of lag1_(ln China social aid * ln World Bank social aid) is exp(1.258) = 3.518. That is, $3,518,000. Thus, one percent of this is 
$35,180. Also, 2.775% + 0.0036% = 2.7786%. 
89 That is two units of social aid receive from China is 0.309*2, which equals 0.618 (this is 0.0062 percent), while two units of social aid receive 
from the World Bank is 0.179*2 this gives us 0.358 (this is 0.00358 percent) both figures are better than when a country gets one unit of social aid 
from each donor (0.0036 percent). Thus, a country is better off receiving its social aid from a donor than splitting it between the two donors.  
 
90 Though the World Bank infrastructure aid is significant in column 1B, it loses this significance as we add more controls in the remaining columns. 
 
91 A detailed explanation of the U.S. economic aid only is explained in Table 3.6. 
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social aid (in columns 1A to 4B) are positive, but only the U.S. social aid is significant.92 The 
overall effect (from the interaction term), columns 1C to 4C, is effective, though it becomes weakly 
significant as we add more controls. A one percent increase in social aid by both donors will lead 
to a 0.0075, 0.0080, 0.0065, and 0.0064 percent increase in the recipient’s GDP per capita growth 
rate. That is, a $322,330 increase in social aid by both the U.S. and the World Bank will increase 
GDP per capita growth rate from 2.775 to 2.781 percent in the recipient countries.93  We further 
compare this overall effect to when a country receives two units of social aid from either donor 
(column 4C). We find that the U.S. social aid is a complement of the World Bank social aid.94 
Table 3.14 displays the results of the infrastructure aid from the U.S., the World Bank, and 
the interaction effect. The results show that infrastructure aid by the U.S. (columns 1A to 4A) and 
the World Bank infrastructure aid (in columns 1B to 4B) is positive but not significant.95 Similarly, 
the overall effect (columns 1C to 4C) is positive but not significant.   
Overall, the results from Tables 3.6  to 3.14 show that all aid types are positive irrespective 
of the donor (China, the U.S., or the World Bank), but only the U.S. economic and social aid 
improve economic growth in recipient countries. Aid types from both China and the World Bank 
are not effective. Likewise, the U.S. infrastructure aid is not effective. The overall effect of both 
China and the U.S. aid types show some improvement, but none is effective. Meanwhile, the 
overall effect of China and the World Bank's economic and social aid improve growth in recipient 
countries. These overall effects also show that Chinese economic aid is a complement of the World 
 
92 The U.S. social aid detailed explanation is in Table 3.7. 
93 The mean level of the lag1_(ln World Bank social aid * ln U.S. social aid) is exp(3.473) = 32,233. That is $32,233,000. Thus, one percent 
increase is $322,330. Furthermore, 2.775% + 0.0064% = 2.7814%. 
94 That is, two units of social aid receive from the U.S. is 0.520*2 equal 1.04 (this is 0.010 percent), while two units of social aid from the World 
Bank is 0.218*2, which equals 0.436 (this is 0.0044). These figures compared to the overall effect of receiving one unit of social aid from each 
donor, which is 0.0064 percent (column 4C), show that the U.S. social aid is a complement of the World Bank social aid. This means a country is 
better off receiving one unit of social aid from each donor than receiving two units of social aid from the World Bank only. 
95 Though they are significant in the first columns but lose the significance as we add more controls. 
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Bank economic aid, while Chinese social aid and the World Bank social aid are both substitutes. 
The overall effect of the China and the World Bank infrastructure aid is not effective.   
Similarly, the overall effect of the U.S. and the World Bank's economic and infrastructure 
aid is not effective. However, the overall effect shows that the U.S. social aid is a complement of 
the World Bank social aid.  
The results reveal that the effects of China aid types on the World Bank aid types are similar 
to the effect of the U.S. aid types on World Bank aid types which shows that the aid impact on 
economic growth depends on the aid type and not the donor. Again, this indicates that bilateral aid 
(China or the U.S.) has a similar impact on multilateral aid (the World Bank).96  
In the rest of the paper, Tables 3.15 to 3.18, we test whether more aid is better. The positive 
effect from the interaction of two donors examined above might be due to more aid and not 
necessarily donor’s effect.  
Thus, in Table 3.15, we report the interaction effect of all aid types (economic, social, and 
infrastructure aid) from the three donors. The results indicate that receiving aid from multiple 
sources does not necessarily lead to better growth outcomes. The impact depends on the type of 
aid. The overall effects of all the aid types are positive, but only economic and social aid from the 
three donors are significant. A one percent increase in the economic aid from the three donors will 
lead to 0.0062, 0.0065, 0.0055, and 0.0056 percent increase in the recipient’s GDP per capita 
growth rate in columns 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4A, respectively. This means that a $1,299,310 economic 
aid receives by a country from the three donors will improve the recipient’s GDP per capita growth 
 
96 We find a pattern (tables 3.9, 3.10, and 3.13), the presence of bilateral donors (China or the U.S.) has a similar effect on the World Bank aid 
types, it makes the World Bank aid types more efficient (not vice versa). This might be because bilateral donors are less bureaucratic in nature. 
Thus, they tend to get things done faster, and the presence of either of them (China or the U.S.) might be a challenge and make the World Bank less 
bureaucratic and be more efficient. But, again, this depends on the type of aid. 
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rate to 2.781 percent.97 Likewise, we compare this overall effect with when a country receives 
three units of economic aid from only one donor instead of receiving one unit of economic aid 
from each of the three donors. The result shows that both the U.S. and Chinese economic aid are 
complements of the World Bank economic aid.98 This supports our prior findings that bilateral  
(China or the U.S.) has a similar impact on multilateral aid (the World Bank).  
Likewise, a one percent increase in the social aid by the three donors (in Table 3.15) will 
lead to 0.0055, 0.0058, 0.005, and 0.0051 percent increase in the recipient’s GDP per capita growth 
rate in columns 1B, 2B, 3B, and 4B, respectively. That is, a $250,030 receives by a country as 
social aid from the three donors will increase the recipient’s GDP per capita growth rate to 2.780 
percent.99 We further compare this result with when a country receives three units of social aid 
from only one donor. The result shows that the U.S. social aid is a complement of both China and 
the World Bank social aid.100 
However, the overall effects of the infrastructure aid by the three donors are not significant. 
Thus, the results indicate more aid is not better. This further supports our earlier findings that the 
impact of aid depends on the aid type and not the donor. 
Table 3.16 shows the total aid results, the official development assistance (ODA) from the 
three donors. The results indicate that both the World Bank and China's ODA are positive in all 
 
97 Lag1_(ln china economic aid * ln U.S. economic aid * ln World Bank economic aid) mean value is exp(4.867) which is 129.931. That is, 
$129,931,000. Thus, one percent of this value is $1,299,310. Also, 2.775% + 0.0056% = 2.7806%. 
98 Three units of economic aid from China give 0.219*3, which is 0.657 (this is 0.0066 percent). Three units of economic aid from the U.S. is 
0.291*3, which equals 0.873 (this is 0.0088 percent). At the same time, three units of economic aid from the World Bank is 0.073*3, which is 0.219 
(that is, 0.0022 percent). We compare these figures to the overall effect of a country receiving one unit of aid from each of the three donors, which 
is 0.563 (that is 0.0056 percent). This shows that the World Bank's economic aid performs better when a country also receives economic aid from 
both China and the U.S. Thus, economic aid from both the U.S. and China are complements of the World Bank economic aid. 
99 Lag1_(ln china social aid * ln U.S. social aid * ln World Bank social aid) mean value is exp(3.219) which is 25.003. That is, $25,003,000. Thus, 
one percent of this value is $250,030. Again, 2.775% + 0.0051% = 2.7801%. 
100 Three units of social aid from China give 0.109*3, which equals 0.327 (this is 0.0033 percent). Three units of social aid from the U.S. is 0.349-
3 is 1.047 (that is 0.010 percent). Meanwhile, three units of social aid from the World Bank is 0.228 (this is 0.0023 percent). These show that both 
China and the World Bank social aid perform better when a country also receives U.S. social aid. Thus, the U.S. social aid is a complement of both 




columns but not effective. Only the U.S. ODA improves growth in developing countries. 
Meanwhile, as we add more controls, the U.S. ODA loses significance, but it is still weakly 
significant as we add all the controls in column 4B. A one percent increase in the U.S.ODA will 
increase the recipient's GDP per capita growth rate by 0.0020, 0.0020, 0.0014, and 0.0014 in 
columns 1A, 2B, 3B, and 4B, respectively. A $221,760 increase in the U.S ODA will increase 
GDP per capita growth rate to 2.776 percent in the recipient country.101  
Table 3.17 presents the result of the interaction effects of ODA between donors. The 
overall effect shows that a country is not always better off if it receives ODA from more than one 
donor. The overall effect of Chinese ODA and the U.S. ODA is positive, but none is significant 
(columns 1A to 4A). For U.S. ODA and World Bank ODA, the overall effect loses significance as 
we add more controls (columns 1C to 4C). However, the overall effect of China ODA and the 
World Bank ODA is effective (columns 1B to 4B). That is, a one percent increase in ODA from 
both China and the World Bank will increase the recipient’s GDP per capita growth rate by 0.0037, 
0.0049, 0.0045, and 0.0045, respectively. This shows that when a country receives $1,109,410 in 
ODA from both China and the World Bank, it will improve its GDP per capita growth rate from 
2.775 to 2.780 percent (column 4B).102 We compare this to when a country receives two units of 
ODA from either donor. The result shows Chinese ODA is a complement of the World Bank 
ODA.103 
 
101 Lag1_(ln U.S.ODA) mean level is exp(3.099) = 22.176. That is $22,176,000. Therefore, one percent is $221,760. Also, the GDP per capita 
2.775% + 0.0014% = 2.7764%. 
102 Lag1_(ln China ODA * ln World Bank ODA) mean level is exp(4.709) = 110.941. This is $110,941,000. Thus, one percent is $1,109,410. Also, 
2.775% + 0.0045% = 2.7795%. 
103 Two units of Chinese ODA give 0.370*2, which is 0.740 (that is 0.0074 percent), while two units of the World Bank ODA give 0.163*2, which 
is 0.326 (this is 0.0033 percent). Meanwhile, one unit of ODA from either donor gives 0.450 (0.0045 percent). These show that the Chinese ODA 
is a complement of the World Bank ODA. That is, when a country receives a unit of ODA from the World Bank, the country is better off if it also 




Table 3.18 shows the results of the ODA interaction effects of all three donors at once. The 
overall effect is positive and only weakly significant. That is, in all columns, when a country 
receives ODA from all three donors, its GDP per capita growth will increase by 0.0036, 0.0045, 
0.0039, and 0.0039, respectively. This means that $5trillion receives from the three donors as ODA 
by a country in a particular year will increase its GDP per capita growth rate from 2.775 to 2.779 
percent.104 This increase in GDP per capita growth rate is very negligible compared to the ODA 
amount received. We further compare this result to when a country receives three units of ODA 
from one donor instead of one unit from each donor. The result shows that both the U.S. and China 
ODA are complements of the World Bank ODA.105 
The ODA interaction results from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18 confirmed our earlier results 
from the donors’ aid types interaction terms (in Table 3.6 to 3.16) that more aid is not better. 
Overall, the results show that the effect of aid on growth depends on aid type and not the donor. 
Foreign aid from all the donors (China, U.S., and the World Bank) have a similar impact on growth 
in recipient countries. 
 
3.3.2 Robustness checks 
For more validity of our results, we provide a robustness check to confirm whether our 
results are sensitive to the choice of controls. We added other controls to further control for the 
institution quality in recipient countries. Thus, we substitute the Frazer freedom index for trade (as 
 
104 Lag1_(ln China ODA * ln U.S. ODA * ln World Bank ODA) mean value is exp(20.207) = 596,744,734.789 This is $596,744,734,789,000. One 
percent is $5,967,447,347,890 which is $5trillion. Also, 2.775% + 0.0039% = 2.7789%. 
105 Three units of Chinese ODA give 0.156*3, which equals 0.468 (that is 0.0047 percent). Three units of the U.S. ODA is 0.167*3, which is 0.501. 
Meanwhile, three units of World Bank ODA is 0.078*3, which gives  0.284 (this is 0.0023 percent). This shows that when a country receives a unit 
of ODA from the World Bank, the country will be better off if it also receives one unit of ODA from both China and the U.S. than receiving all 




% of GDP), investment rate, and government expenditure (Gwartney et al., 2018). Likewise, we 
substitute coup for durability (Marshall and Marshall, 2019). The results support our prior findings 
that the impact of aid on growth depends on the aid type and not the donor. The overall effects 
also show some improvements but mostly insignificant. This result is available on request.  
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
China has suddenly risen as a major foreign aid donor (Harada and Kitano, 2016). China 
operates on a policy of no intervention. That is, China disregards the macroeconomic environment 
and institutional quality in the recipient countries. China does not follow OECD-DAC soft laws 
on aid allocation. China does not follow the set standard for donor’s best practices in aid 
disbursement and implements, which stress transparency, anti-corruption, and accountability, as 
western donors do. (Tan-Mullins, Mohan, & Power, 2010; Dreher et al., 2017). We fill a research 
gap by examining the impact of Chinese types of aid (economic, social, and infrastructure) as 
compared to other donors (the World Bank and the U.S.). We further test whether Chinese types 
of aid are substitutes or complements of types of aid from other donors. 
Our results provide evidence that the impact of aid on economic growth depends largely 
on the aid type and not necessarily the donor. All the aid types are positive irrespective of the 
donor, though only the U.S aid types show some improvements in economic growth in developing 
countries. Chinese  and the World Bank types of aid are not effective. These findings are consistent 
with the aid literature that claim most aid to developing countries are not effective (Doucouliagos 
and Paldam, 2011:Nowak-Lehman et al., 2012). Furthermore, we find evidence that Chinese 
economic aid is a complement of the World Bank economic aid. Our results further show that 
Chinese social aid and the World Bank social aid are both substitutes. Again, our result provides 
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evidence that bilateral aid (China and the U.S.) has a similar impact on multilateral aid. The effect 
of either the U.S. or China types of aid on the World Bank types of aid depends on the aid type. 
Furthermore, we provide evidence that receiving aid from the three donors does not 
necessarily make a country better off. That is, more aid is not always better. The impact of aid 
depends on the aid type.106 
The results show that aid is endogenous. After controlling for aid endogeneity, our findings 
are robust across the choice of controls. Our results collectively show that more than the donor 
type, the type of aid, to a large extent, determines aid’s impact on economic growth in developing 
countries. These results do not invalidate the findings in some aid literature that donor types 
matter.107 They only reinforce the claim of the emerging studies in the aid literature that 
disaggregate aid by type can lead to moderate improvements on the impact of aid (Michaelowa, 
2004; Bjorskov, 2014). 
Overall, both essays support the claims of the new studies in aid literature that ODA might 
not be effective, but if we focus more on disaggregate aid, we could 1) eliminate the difficulties in 




106 The overall effect from both the interaction terms of the three donors’ types of aid and the interaction terms of the ODA from the three donors 
(Tables 3.15 to 3.18 lay credence to this.   
107 As we have shown earlier in the paper, there is no consensus on the effect of donor type on aid’s effectiveness in the literature. 
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Table 3.1 Sample of U.S. health aid project. 


































Table 3.2 After we split the data by the project length, the project in table 1 becomes: 
Project id Recipient Sector 
name 



















































Table 3.2: shows that the amount $537,185 in Table 3.1 is split into 8 equal parts according to the project length (2005 to 2012). 
Therefore, each year has $67,148.125. 
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1 Angola 21 Liberia 42 Algeria 51 Afghanistan 63 Cambodia 75 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 84 Bolivia 94 Albania 
2 Benin 22 Madagascar 43 Egypt 52 Bangladesh 64 Indonesia 76 Barbados 85 Brazil 95 Belarus 
3 Botswana 23 Malawi 44 Iran 53 India 65 Laos 77 Dominica 86 Chile 96 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
4 Burundi 24 Mali 45 Iraq 54 Kazakhstan 66 Malaysia 78 Grenada 87 Colombia 97 Georgia 
5 Cabo Verde 25 Mauritania 46 Jordan 55 Kyrgyzstan 67 Mongolia 79 Haiti 88 Ecuador 98  Macedonia 
6 Cameroon 26 Mauritius 47 Lebanon 56 Maldives 68 
Papua 
New 




Republic 27 Mozambique 48 Morocco 57 Nepal 69 Philippines 81 Mexico 90 Peru 100 Russia 
8 Chad 28 Namibia 49 Tunisia 58 Pakistan 70 Thailand 82 Nicaragua 91 
Trinidad 
& Tobago 101 Serbia 
9 Comoros 29 Niger 50 Yemen 59 Sri Lanka 71 
Timor-
Leste 83 St. Lucia 92 Uruguay 102 Turkey 
10 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 30 Nigeria   60 Tajikistan 72 Tonga   93 Venezuela 103 Ukraine 
11 Congo, Rep. 31 Rwanda   61 Turkmenistan 73 Vanuatu       
12 Cote d'Ivoire 32 Senegal   62 Uzbekistan 74 Vietnam       
13 Djibouti 33 Seychelles             
14 Eritrea 34 Sierra Leone             
15 Ethiopia 35 South Africa             
16 Gabon 36 South Sudan             
17 Ghana 37 Tanzania      
 
      
18 Guinea 38 Togo     
 
      
19 
Guinea-
Bissau 39 Uganda           
20 Kenya 40 Zambia     
  
    
41 Zimbabwe         
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Table 3.4 Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation. 
Minimum Maximum 
Ln U.S economic aid 1545 2.011 1.655 -0.038 6.347 
Lag1_(ln U.S economic aid)  1545 1.858 1.670 -0.038 6.347 
Ln U.S. social aid 1545 1.492 1.404 -0.430 6.176 
Lag1_(ln U.S. social aid) 1545 1.374 1.398 -0.430 6.176 
Ln U.S. infrastructure aid 1545 1.895 1.573 -0.148 8.189 
Lag1_(ln U.S. infrastructure aid) 1545 1.758 1.593 -0.148 8.189 
Ln U.S residual aid 1545 2.821 1.901 -0.073 8.987 
Lag1_(ln U.S. residual aid) 1545 2.613 1.969 -0.073 8.987 
Ln World Bank economic aid 1545 2.432 1.749 0 7.496 
Lag1_(ln World Bank economic aid) 1545 2.253 1.787 0 7.496 
Ln World Bank social aid 1545 1.965 1.563 0 6.509 
Lag1_(ln World Bank social aid) 1545 1.812 1.577 0 6.509 
Ln World Bank infrastructure aid) 1545 2.598 1.679 0 6.746 
Lag1_(ln World Bank infrastructure aid) 1545 2.423 1.739 0 6.746 
Ln World Bank residual 1545 3.09 1.813 0 7.601 
Lag1_(ln World Bank residual aid) 1545 2.876 1.908 0 7.601 
Ln China economic aid) 1545 0.629 1.460 0 9.105 
Lag1_(ln China economic aid) 1545 0.596 1.431 0 9.105 
Ln China social aid 1545 0.611 1.232 0 6.567 
Lag1_(ln China social aid) 1545 0.565 1.185 0 6.567 
Ln China infrastructure aid 1545 0.661 1.187 0 6.293 
Lag1_(ln China infrastructure) 1545 0.609 1.145 0 6.293 
Ln China residual aid 1545 0.930 1.445 0 6.509 
Lag1_(ln China residual aid) 1545 0.864 1.402 0 6.509 
Ln U.S. ODA 1545 3.346 2.082 -0.064 9.393 
Lag1_(ln U.S. ODA) 1545 3.099 2.180 -0.064 9.393 
Ln World Bank ODA 1545 3.811 2.024 0 8.477 
Lag1_(ln World Bank ODA) 1545 3.546 2.166 0 8.477 
Ln China ODA 1545 1.271 1.791 0 7.550 
Lag1_(ln China ODA) 1545 1.182 1.745 0 7.550 
Ln China economic aid * Ln U.S. 
economic aid 
1545 1.702 4.883 0 32.317 
Lag1_ (ln China economic aid * ln U.S. 
economic aid) 
1545 1.612 4.787 0 32.317 
Ln China social aid * Ln US social aid 1545 1.260 3.433 -0.012 29.827 
Lag1_(ln China social aid * ln US social 
aid) 
1545 1.165 3.319 -0.012 29.827 
Ln China infrastructure aid * Ln U.S. 
infrastructure aid) 
1545 1.329 3.173 -0.534 28.628 
Lag1_(ln China infrastructure aid * ln U.S. 
infrastructure aid) 
1545 1.207 2.985 -0.534 25.578 
Ln China economic aid * Ln World Bank 
economic aid 
1545 1.600 4.417 0 34.875 
Lag1_( ln China economic aid * ln World 
Bank economic aid) 
1545 1.518 4.326 0 34.875 
Ln China social aid * Ln World Bank 
social aid 
1545 1.368 3.615 0 31.972 
Lag1_( ln China social aid * ln World 
Bank social aid) 
1545 1.258 3.474 0 31.972 
Ln China infrastructure aid * Ln World 
bank infrastructure aid 
1545 1.772 4.042 0 30.437 
Lag1_(ln China infrastructure aid * ln 
World bank infrastructure aid) 
1545 1.623 3.837 0 30.437 
Ln U.S economic aid * Ln World Bank. 
economic aid 
1545 6.278 7.435 0 35.621 
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Table 3.4 Summary Statistics(continued) 
 Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation. 
Minimum Maximum 
Lag1_( ln U.S. economic aid * ln World 
Bank economic aid) 
1545 5.765 7.296 0 35.621 
Ln U.S. social aid * Ln World Bank social 
aid 
1545 3.809 5.094 -1.069 28.724 
Lag1_( ln U.S. social aid * ln U.S. social 
aid) 
1545 3.473 4.942 -1.069 28.724 
Ln U.S. infrastructure aid * Ln World 
Bank infrastructure aid 
1545 6.273 6.917 -0.272 39.282 
Lag1_(ln U.S. infrastructure aid * ln 
World Bank infrastructure aid) 
1545 5.813 6.865 -0.272 39.282 
Ln China economic aid * Ln U.S. 
economic aid * Ln World Bank economic 
aid 
1545 5.103 16.754 0 134.153 
Lag1_( Ln China economic aid * Ln U.S. 
economic aid * Ln World Bank economic 
aid) 
1545 4.867 16.554 0 134.153 
Ln China social aid * ln U.S. social aid * 
ln World Bank social aid) 
1545 3.463 12.318 -0.005 155.057 
Lag1_( Ln China social aid * ln U.S. 
social aid * ln World Bank social aid) 
1545 3.219 11.946 -0.005 155.057 
Ln China infrastructure aid * Ln U.S. 
infrastructure aid * Ln World Bank 
infrastructure aid 
1545 4.483 13.376 -0.984 155.806 
Lag1_(Ln China infrastructure aid * Ln 
U.S. infrastructure aid * Ln World Bank 
infrastructure aid) 
1545 4.062 12.376 -0.984 146.814 
Ln China ODA * Ln U.S. ODA 1545 4.791 8.298 0 47.924 
Lag1_(ln China ODA * ln U.S. ODA) 1545 4.429 8.006 0 47.924 
Ln China ODA * Ln World Bank ODA 1545 5.079 8.529 0 46.936 
Lag1_(ln China ODA * ln World Bank 
ODA) 
1545 4.709 8.243 0 46.936 
Ln World Bank ODA * Ln U.S. ODA 1545 14.950 12.983 -0.199 53.754 
Lag1_(ln World Bank ODA * ln U.S. 
ODA) 
1545 13.800 13.043 -0.199 53.754 
Ln China ODA * ln U.S. ODA * ln World 
Bank ODA 
1545 21.839 44.772 0 308.535 
Lag1_( Ln China ODA * ln U.S. ODA * 
ln World Bank ODA) 
1545 20.207 43.079 0 308.535 
GDP per capita Growth (annual %) 1545 2.775 3.787 -6.350 11.961 
Ln GDP per capita 1545 7.584 1.112 5.269 9.340 
Lag1_lnGDP per capita 1545 7.066 2.173 0 9.340 
Investment rate 1545 23.147 8.397 3.595 41.993 
Lag1_Investment rate 1545 21.461 9.909 0 41.993 
Government expenditure (% of GDP) 1545 14.500 5.218 0.896 27.652 
Lag1_Government expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
1545 13.504 6.204 0 27.652 
Democracy (polity2) 1410 2.899 5.430 -9.000 10.000 
Lag1_ Democracy (polity2) 1410 2.667 5.306 -9.000 10.000 
Life expectancy at birth 1530 64.554 8.984 38.690 81.496 
Lag1_ Life expectancy at birth 1530 60.061 18.280 0 81.198 





Table 3.4 Summary Statistics(continued) 
 Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation. 
Minimum Maximum 
Lag1_ Durable (Political Stability) 1380 12.399 12.284 0 41.500 
Ln Disaster (total affected) 1545 6.937 5.582 0 19.645 
Lag1_ Disaster (total affected) 1545 6.527 5.650 0 19.645 
Trade (% of GDP 1545 82.190 35.585 17.221 174.715 
Lag1_ Trade (% of GDP 1545 76.639 40.041 0 174.715 




Table 3.5 Collinearity Diagnostics  
Independent Variables VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
GDP per capitat-1             1.45 1.20 0.689 0.311 
Investment ratet-1                    1.98 1.41 0.505 0.495 
Government expenditure (% of GDP)t- 1.46 1.21 0.686 0.314 
Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 1.10 1.05 0.907 0.093 
Life expectancy at birtht-1 2.80 1.67 0.358 0.642 
Durable (Political Stability)t-1 1.28 1.13 0.782 0.218 
Disaster (total affected)t-1 1.03 1.02 0.966 0.034 
Openness (Trade % of GDP)t-1 1.54 1.24 0.650 0.350 
Mean VIF 1.58    
VIF of 1 means no correlation among a predictor and other predictor variables, VIFs of 4 call for concern, VIFs of 10 and above 
are signs of serious multicollinearity. The VIFs in our predictor variables range between 1 and 2.80.   Again, according to the 
literature, Tolerance is the percent of the variance in the predictor that cannot be accounted for by other predictors. 
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Table 3.6  The Growth effect of economic aid by China, the U.S., and the interaction term. Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth   GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
































Ln China Economic Aid multiply 
by Ln  U.S. Economic Aidt-1 














































































 Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 
 






























Durable (Political Stability)t-1 
 




























    0.010** 
(0.005) 
    0.012*** 
(0.005) 
    0.012** 
(0.005) 
























Hausman Test   8.250 15.780 24.450 22.960  14.080 18.890 25.640 26.130  17.670 23.250 33.240 33.650 
Prob > chi2  0.041 0.008 0.002 0.006  0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002  0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Overall Effect of receiving 
economic aid from both the U.S. 
and China 
           0.463 0.474 0.396 0.384 
R-squared   0.008 0.012 0.020 0.024  0.020 0.021 0.026 0.031  0.021 0.022 0.027 0.031 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3.7 The Growth effect of Social aid by China, the U.S., and the interaction term. Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth   GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
































Ln China Social Aid multiply by Ln  
U.S. Social Aidt-1 














































































 Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 
 






























Durable (Political Stability)t-1 
 




























    0.011** 
(0.005) 
    0.011** 
(0.004) 
    0.011** 
(0.005) 
























Hausman Test   8.970 15.720 23.65 22.810  13.090 17.940 23.880 24.360  14.830 20.280 27.020 27.430 
Prob > chi2  0.030 0.007 0.003 0.007  0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004  0.011 0.005 0.003 0.004 
Overall Effect of receiving Social aid 
from both U.S. and China 
           0.376 0.404 0.357 0.345 
R-squared   0.006 0.009 0.018 0.022  0.019 0.022 0.026 0.031  0.020 0.022 0.026 0.031 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92 





Table 3.8 The Growth effect of Infrastructure aid by China, the U.S., and the interaction term. Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth   GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
































Ln China  Infrastructure Aid 
multiply by Ln  U.S. 
Infrastructure  Aidt-1 














































































 Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 
 






























Durable (Political Stability)t-1 
 




























    0.011** 
(0.005) 
    0.011** 
(0.005) 
    0.011** 
(0.005) 
























Hausman Test   7.670 14.580 22.010 20.990  12.360 15.560 24.370 24.910  16.200 19.760 29.070 29.100 
Prob > chi2  0.055 0.012 0.005 0.013  0.006 0.008 0.002 0.003  0.006 0.006 0.001 0.002 
Overall Effect of receiving 
infrastructure aid from both 
China and the U.S. 
           0.163 0.218 0.147 0.159 
R-squared   0.006 0.009 0.018 0.022  0.012 0.013 0.019 0.024  0.012 0.013 0.019 0.024 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3.9 The Growth effect of economic aid by China, the World Bank, and the interaction term. Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth   GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
































Ln China Economic Aid multiply by 
Ln  World Bank Economic Aidt-1 














































































 Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 
 






























Durable (Political Stability)t-1 
 




























    0.010** 
(0.005) 
    0.013*** 
(0.005) 
    0.011** 
(0.005) 
























Hausman Test   8.250 15.780 24.450 22.960  9.290 14.490 21.910 24.190  17.540 23.630 33.42 36.07 
Prob > chi2  0.041 0.008 0.002 0.006  0.028 0.013 0.005 0.004  0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Overall Effect of receiving economic 
aid from both China and the World 
Bank  
           0.540 0.554 0.493 0.507 
R-squared   0.008 0.012 0.020 0.024  0.012 0.013 0.019 0.025  0.018 0.021 0.027 0.031 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.10 The Growth effect of Social aid by China, the World Bank, and the interaction term. Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth   GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
































Ln China Social Aid multiply by Ln  
World Bank Social Aidt-1 














































































 Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 
 






























Durable (Political Stability)t-1 
 




























    0.011** 
(0.005) 
    0.012*** 
(0.005) 
    0.012** 
(0.005) 
























Hausman Test   8.970 15.720 23.65 22.810  9.740 17.900 25.720 28.730  12.670 23.020 26.760 30.340 
Prob > chi2  0.030 0.007 0.003 0.007  0.021 0.012 0.004 0.003  0.027 0.002 0.003 0.001 
Overall Effect of receiving Social 
aid  from both China and the World 
Bank  
           0.368 0.372 0.334 0.355 
R-squared   0.006 0.009 0.018 0.022  0.011 0.012 0.019 0.024  0.013 0.015 0.022 0.027 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92 





Table 3.11 The Growth effect of Infrastructure aid by China, the World Bank, and the interaction term. Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth   GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
































Ln China  Infrastructure Aidt-1  multiply by 
Ln  World Bank  Infrastructure  Aidt-1 














































































 Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 
 






























Durable (Political Stability)t-1 
 




























    0.011** 
(0.005) 
    0.012*** 
(0.005) 
    0.012*** 
(0.005) 
























Hausman Test   7.670 14.580 22.010 20.990  9.860 14.590 22.210 24.51  12.940 17.940 26.240 27.980 
Prob > chi2  0.055 0.012 0.005 0.013  0.020 0.012 0.005 0.014  0.024 0.012 0.003 0.003 
Overall Effect of receiving infrastructure 
aid from both China and the World Bank  
           0.208 0.279 0.222 0.234 
R-squared   0.006 0.009 0.018 0.022  0.014 0.014 0.019 0.025  0.014 0.014 0.020 0.025 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.12 The Growth effect of economic aid by the U.S., the World Bank, and the interaction term. Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth   GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
































Ln U.S. Economic Aid multiply by Ln  
World Bank  Economic Aidt-1 














































































 Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 
 






























Durable (Political Stability)t-1 
 




























    0.012*** 
(0.005) 
    0.013*** 
(0.005) 
    0.013*** 
(0.005) 
























Hausman Test   14.080 18.890 25.640 26.130  9.290 14.490 21.910 24.190  17.730 22.100 28.59 31.300 
Prob > chi2  0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002  0.028 0.013 0.005 0.004  0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Overall Effect of receiving economic aid 
from both the U.S. and the World Bank  
           0.614 0.713 0.585 0.598 
R-squared   0.020 0.021 0.026 0.031  0.012 0.013 0.019 0.025  0.021 0.022 0.027 0.032 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92 





Table 3.13 The Growth effect of Social aid by the U.S., the World Bank, and the interaction term. Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth   GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
































Ln U.S. Social Aid multiply by Ln  
World Bank Social Aidt-1 














































































 Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 
 






























Durable (Political Stability)t-1 
 




























    0.011** 
(0.004) 
    0.012*** 
(0.005) 
    0.011** 
(0.005) 
























Hausman Test   13.090 17.940 23.880 24.360  9.290 14.490 21.910 24.190  17.630 23.020 26.760 30.340 
Prob > chi2  0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004  0.028 0.013 0.005 0.004  0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 
Overall Effect of receiving social aid 
from  both U.S. and  the World 
Bank  
           0.746 0.797 0.645 0.638 
R-squared   0.019 0.022 0.026 0.031  0.012 0.013 0.019 0.025  0.023 0.025 0.028 0.032 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.14 The Growth effect of Infrastructure aid by U.S., the World Bank, and the interaction term. Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth   GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
































Ln U.S.  Infrastructure Aid multiply by 
Ln  World Bank  Infrastructure  Aidt-1 














































































 Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 
 






























Durable (Political Stability)t-1 
 




























    0.011** 
(0.005) 
    0.012*** 
(0.005) 
    0.012*** 
(0.005) 
























Hausman Test   12.360 15.560 24.370 24.910  9.860 14.590 22.210 24.51  13.580 18.040 26.030 28.130 
Prob > chi2  0.006 0.008 0.002 0.003  0.020 0.012 0.005 0.014  0.019 0.012 0.004 0.003 
Overall Effect of receiving 
infrastructure aid from both the U.S. 
and the World Bank 
           0.505 0.571 0.369 0.368 
R-squared   0.012 0.013 0.019 0.024  0.014 0.014 0.019 0.025  0.017 0.017 0.020 0.026 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92 





Table 3.15 The Growth effect of  aid types interaction by all donors (China, the U.S., and the World Bank Annual data (2000-
2014). 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth   GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 








          








          








          
Ln China Economic Aid * Ln  U.S. 










          








     








     








     
Ln China Social Aidt-1 * Ln  U.S. Social 
Aidt-1  * Ln World Bank Social Aidt-1 








     
























Ln China Infrastructure Aidt-1*  Ln  U.S. 
Infrastructure Aidt-1  * Ln World Bank 
Infrastructure Aidt-1 














































































 Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 
 






























Durable (Political Stability)t-1 
 




























    0.012** 
(0.005) 
    0.011** 
(0.005) 









  GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
























Hausman Test   22.550 28.270 37.070 39.920  18.360 22.640 27.760 30.360  16.050 19.780 29.360 30.610 
Prob > chi2  0.001 0.0004 0.000 0.000  0.006 0.004 0.004 0.003  0.014 0.011 0.002 0.002 
Overall Effect of receiving aid types 
from all donors, China, the U.S. and the 
World Bank  
 0.617 0.652 0.549 0.563  0.548 0.579 0.500 0.510  0.278 0.344 0.238 0.266 
R-squared   0.023 0.025 0.029 0.034   0.025 0.029 0.033  0.016 0.016 0.020 0.026 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92 




Table 3.16 The Growth effect of ODA by China, the U. S., and the World Bank Annual data (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth   GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 








          








     














































































 Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 
 


























































    0.011** 
(0.005) 
    0.012*** 
(0.004) 
    0.012*** 
(0.005) 
























Hausman Test   7.690 14.960 22.880 21.820  14.170 16.830 25.030 25.930  10.550 15.060 22.210 25.010 
Prob > chi2  0.053 0.011 0.004 0.010  0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002  0.014 0.010 0.005 0.003 
R-squared   0.006 0.009 0.018 0.023  0.017 0.018 0.022 0.028  0.013 0.013 0.019 0.024 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92 






Table 3.17  The Growth effect of ODA interaction by two donors (China, the U.S., and the World Bank). (2000-2014) 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth   GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
















     
























          
















Ln China ODAt-1 * Ln World Bank  
ODAt-1 








     
Ln U.S. ODAt-1 * Ln World Bank  
ODAt-1 














































































 Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 
 


























































         0.011** 
(0.005) 
    0.011** 
(0.005) 
























Hausman Test   16.700 19.960 30.620 31.650  15.550 20.860 29.270 32.230  18.270 22.34 29.050 32.290 
Prob > chi2  0.005 0.006 0.001 0.001  0.008 0.004 0.001 0.001  0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Overall effect of receiving  ODA 
from two donors. 
 0.180 0.256 0.222 0.218  0.373 0.491 0.451 0.450  0.574 0.663 0.535 0.509 
R-squared   0.017 0.018 0.022 0.010  0.013 0.015 0.022 0.026  0.020 0.021 0.024 0.029 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3.18 The Growth effect of ODA interaction by three donors (China, the U.S., and the 
World Bank). (2000-2014). 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth  
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A) 
























Ln China ODAt-1 * Ln U.S. ODAt-1 * 



































 Polity2 (Democracy)t-1 
 






















    0.011** 
(0.005) 








Hausman Test   18.680 22.190 32.680 35.560 
Prob > chi2  0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 
Overall Effect of receiving ODA from 
China, U.S. and the World Bank. 
 0.360 0.450 0.388 0.393 
R-squared   0.019 0.020 0.024 0.029 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92 





Figure 3.1 U.S. ODA by year and country for 103 developing countries (2000-2014). 
(A) U.S. ODA by year for 103 developing countries. 
















Figure 3.2 China ODA by year and country for 103 developing countries (2000-2014).  
(A) China ODA by year for 103 developing countries. 

















Figure 3.3 World  Bank ODA by year (2000-2014) for 103 developing countries. 
(A) World Bank ODA by year for 103 developing countries. 









Figure 3.4 Aid types (economic, social, and infrastructure aid) by donors for 103 developing 
countries (2000-2014). 
(A) U.S. aid types. 
(B) China aid types. 
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CROSS-SECTIONAL REGESSION FIRST STAGE RESULT FOR CHAPTER II      
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Table A.1 Cross section first stage results of the impact of World Bank education aid per capita on educational outcomes. 
First Stage results 
  Total education aid per capita (sum 1 to 15 years)  Total education aid per capita (sum 1 to 15 years)  Total education aid per capita (sum 1 to 15 years) 
VARIABLES  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
% Change in ideal points 

























% Change in ideal points 

























% Change in ideal points 
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% Change in urban 
population  


















Average political freedom 
index 






























 % Change in government 
expenditure on education 












% Change in Trade (% of 
GDP) 
    -0.003 
(0.037) 
    -0.003 
(0.037) 
    -0.003 
(0.037) 
























Observations (Number of 
Countries) 
 83 83 74 73  83 83 74 73  83 83 74 73 






VARIABLE DESCRIPTION FOR CHAPTER II 
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Table B.1 Variables use in estimation for chapter 2. 
Variable   Description        Source 
Ln GDP growth  Log of GDP growth (annual %)  World Bank (2017). 
Ln GDP per capital  Log of GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$)  World Bank (2017). 
 Gross Enrollment 
ratio Primary 
 Gross enrollment ratio, primary, both sexes (%) 
 
 World Bank (2017). 
 Gross Enrollment 
ratio Secondary 
 Gross enrolment ratio, secondary, both sexes (%) 
 
 World Bank (2017). 
Gross Enrollment ratio 
Tertiary 
 Log of Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary, both sexes (%) 
 
 World Bank (2017). 
Ln World Bank 
Education aid per 
capita  
 We divide the education aid of each year for each recipient 
country with the population of that country for that year. And 
we take the log to get the log of education aid per capita.  
 The World Bank education aid is education aid to the 
education level specify (primary, secondary, and tertiary 
education) and education level unspecified (education aid 
given to two or three education levels at once).  
 1. AidData.org 
2.  OECD-DAC/CRD 
Economic Freedom 
Index (Fraser freedom 
index) 
 The Fraser freedom index captures the economic institutions 
of the recipient countries of education aid. We term this 
variable the economic freedom index in our paper. The 
economic freedom index is on a scale of 1 to 10. Here, 10 
represents the highest level of economic freedom in a country. 
This index is robust (just like the political freedom index). The 
Fraser freedom index includes a range of factors that, as much 
as possible, measure the economic environment of a country. 
Some of these are state protection of ownership of property, 
the extent to which the people can make personal choices—
protection of property rights. Others are Judicial 
independence, Impartial courts, legal enforcement of 
contracts, business costs of crime, Gender Adjustment, Money 
growth, inflation, trade, business regulation, and a host of 
others  
 (Gwartney et al., 2018).  
 
Trade (% of GDP)  Trade (% of GDP  World Bank (2017). 




 Expenditure on education as % of total government 
expenditure (%) 
 
 World Bank (2017). 
Political Freedom 
Index 
 The political freedom index data measures the political rights 
and civil liberties of a country. It is an index measured on a 
scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest degree of 
freedom and 7 the lowest  
 Freedom house (2003). 
Urban Population  Urban population (% of total)  World Bank (2017). 
Ideal Points Distance 
from Germany, 
France, Italy, and 
Japan. 
 Ideal Point Distance is the similarity of voting patterns 
between the donor. and  recipient of aid. The data is from the 
United Nations voting data. 
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Table C.1 HT-IV SAS codes for chapter 2 
Table  We used  SAS software 9.4: SAS/STAT 14.2 for all the estimations. 
Additional host information: X64_10HOME WIN 10.0.19041  Workstation 
The SAS codes of HT-IV estimations in Tables 6, 7,8, and 9 in our paper are displayed below:  
Table 2.6  
Column 1A 
* Hausman-Taylor estimator in PROC PANEL; 
proc panel data=work.finaldatacolaandb; 
id country year; 
instruments correlated = (logwbeduaidpc); 




* Hausman-Taylor estimator in PROC PANEL; 
proc panel data=work.finaldatacolaandb; 
id country year; 
instruments correlated = (logwbeduaidpc); 




* Hausman-Taylor estimator in PROC PANEL; 
proc panel data=work.finaldatacolc; 
id country year; 
instruments correlated = (logwbeduaidpc exp_edu_govt); 
model  lead3genrol_p = logwbeduaidpc newgdppercap newgdpgrowth pfi urbanpopulation infl 




* Hausman-Taylor estimator in PROC PANEL; 
proc panel data=work.finaldatacold; 
id country year; 
instruments correlated = (logwbeduaidpc exp_edu_govt); 
model  lead3genrol_p = logwbeduaidpc newgdppercap newgdpgrowth pfi urbanpopulation infl 
exp_edu_govt trade / htaylor; 
run; 
 We substitute lead3genrol_s for lead3genrol_p in Table 6 columns 1B, 2B, 3B, and 4B. Likewise, we 
substitute lead3genrol_t for lead3genrol_p in Table 6 columns 1C, 2C, 3C, and 4C as dependent variables, 
respectively.  
Table 2.9 We substitute trade and inflation rate in the original model with the Economic freedom index (Frazer 
freedom index) in table 2.6. 
Table 2.10 We add other types of aid by the World Bank to table 2.6 
Table 2.11 We run table 6 with OECD-DAC/CRS dataset. 
 Where: logwbeduaidpc is log of World Bank education aid per capita; exp_edu_govt is government 
expenditure on education; newgdppercap is  GDP per capita; newgdpgrowth is  GDP growth; pfi is political 
freedom index; urbanpopulation is urban population; infl is the inflation rate; trade is trade % of GDP;  
Lead3genrol_p is third-year gross enrollment rates primary; lead3genrol_s is third-year gross enrollment rates 
secondary; lead3genrol_t is third-year gross enrollment rates tertiary education.  
Note: log World Bank education aid per capita (logwbeduaidpc)  is endogenous thus we put it in the instrument 
correlated statemen.  
Likewise, government expenditure on education (exp_edu_govt) is endogenous too. We  included it too in the 






ivreg2 newpccpri_ofdk pccnewgdppercap_ofd pccnewgdpgrowth_ofd pccurbanpopulation_ofd pfi_ofdavg 
pccinfl_ofd pccexp_edu_govt_ofd pcctrade_ofd  (wbeduaidpcst =    pcciddist_fra pcciddist_ger pcciddist_ita 
pcciddist_jpn ), small first robust 
where:  newpccpri_ofdk is % change in primary enrollment. rates;  pccnewgdppercap_ofd is % change in GDP 
per capita;  pccnewgdpgrowth_ofd is % change in GDP growth;  pccurbanpopulation_ofd is % in urban 
population;  pfi_ofdavg is average of political freedom index;  pccinfl_ofd is % change in inflation;  
pccexp_edu_govt_ofd is % change in government expenditure on education;  pcctrade_ofd is % change in 
trade. Furthermore,  wbeduaidpcst is sum education aid 2000 to 2014; others are  pcciddist_fra,  pcciddist_ger,  
pcciddist_ita, and  pcciddist_jpn are ideal points distance from France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.  
 
Note: the dependent variable is changed to % change in secondary enrollment. rates  in columns 1B to 4B, and 














FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR CHAPTER III 
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Table D.1 Separating Chinese types of aid with its factor weight for chapter 3. 
 
comp1  




comp3   
(China economic 
aid) residual 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing and Food 
aid   0.50 0.50 
 Banking, Business, and other Financial 
services aid  0.18  0.55 0.27 
Communication aid 0.41   0.59 
Education aid 0.42 0.16  0.42 
Emergency response aid 0.42 0.15  0.43 
Energy aid  0.51  0.49 
Health aid 0.12 0.28 0.46 0.14 
Government and Civil Society aid  0.42 0.20 0.38 
Industry, Mining, Construction aid  0.35 0.37  0.28 
Other Social infrastructure and services aid   0.51  0.49 
Transport and Storage aid  0.46 0.11  0.43 
Water Supply and sanitation aid  0.21 0.14 0.26 0.39 
Other multisector aid 0.23  0.34 0.45 
After principal component analysis (PCA), we apply oblique rotation for maximum factor weight loading on each component. 
Note, we do not use the  PCA categorization as our data for estimation. We only use the PCA figures to re-classify our original aid 
data into three meaningful categories before estimations. 
 
The following is the PCA process for the Chinese types of aid. First, we took the average 
of the aid types by the recipient. Second, Chinese aid has 24 aid types, 11 of which were not 
initially captured in the PCA due to low observations. To resolve this, we categorized these 11 aid 
types with their similar aid types before applying PCA. Thus, the PCA now captured all the aid 
types. The categorizations are: (1) food aid is added to agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing aid, (2) 
general environmental protection aid is added to health aid (3) budget support is added to 
government and civil society aid (5) action relating to debt, banking, and financial services are 
added to the business and other services. (4) the following: population policies, NGOs, women in 
development, and unallocated or unspecific aid, nonfood aid, and trade policy and regulations aid 
are added to other multi-sector aid. Thus, we have one observation per country for the PCA. 
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Though the aid types with these low observations are combined with the various similar purpose 
code, using Principal components analysis on the data after the combination allows the data load 
into respective components in a statistically valid way. Thus, this initial categorization before PCA 
does not affect our PCA results.108  
Third, we apply PCA to the data. The result gives us four factors (or components), three 
out of which have eigenvalues above one. We retained only the three with eigenvalues above since 
they capture more variation in the data (the three factors jointly explained 94 percent variations in 
the Chinese types of aid data).  Fourth, to get maximum factor weight loading on each component, 
we use oblique rotation to weigh the three retained components into three meaningful and 
interpretable categories, as display in Appendix table D.1 above.  
           Finally, we renamed the three components according to their loading on each type. Any of 
the three components that load substantially on aid directed towards the overall purpose of 
productive investment (e.g., agriculture aid, health aid, or education aid) is renamed as economic 
aid. Any component that loads largely on aid directed towards industry, mining, transport, and 
energy is renamed as infrastructure aid or construction aid. Any component that does not load on 
those aid types mentioned or load on aid directed towards non-pecuniary social development 
through government policy is renamed as social aid.  
           Thus, for Chinese aid types, Appendix table D.1 shows that a substantial percentage of 
communication aid, education aid, emergency response aid, transport aid loads on component one 
 
108 This first categorization is necessary because after taking the average of the data by recipient of aid. Some of the aid types have too low 
observations. Thus, they are not captured in the PCA. We try several measures to resolve this. For instance, we added zeros to the blanks spaces at 
this stage, but this distorts the PCA results as adding zeros gives us PCA results with 12 components with eigenvalues above one for the Chinese 
aid (the same is applicable to other donors too). Again, the first three components only explain less than 37 percent variations in the data (this is 
not a good PCA results). To be acceptable PCA, the eigenvalues above one should not be more than five components, and the first three components 
must explain at least 60 percent variations in the data. Therefore, adding zeros at this stage does not work. 
Thus, our best option is to recategorize the data by adding those aid types with very few observations to their similar aid type, as we have done in 
our paper, then do PCA on the data. Thus, we have one observation per recipient for the PCA. For the Chinese aid, this gives us four components, 
with three of the components having eigenvalues above one, and they jointly explained 94 percent variations in the Chinese aid data. This result is 
similar to what we obtained for both the U.S. and the World Bank aid data. Note: the first stage classification does not change the PCA results. It 
only allows us to capture all the aid data in our analysis. 
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we renamed this Chinese Social aid. Moreover, a large percentage of energy aid; Industry, Mining, 
Construction aid; and other social infrastructure and services aid loads on component two, we 
renamed this as  Chinese infrastructure or construction aid. Lastly, a considerable part of 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and food aid; health aid; other multisector aid; Others are  Banking, 
Business, and other Financial services aid; water supply and sanitation aid load on component 




















Table D.2 Separating the World Bank types of aid with its factor weight for chapter 3. 
 
Comp1 (World 
Bank economic aid) 
comp2 (World Bank 
infrastructure aid) 
comp3 (World 
Bank Social aid residual 
Agriculture and Forestry aid    0.28 0.22 0.16 0.34 
Banking and Financial Services aid 0.47 0.12  0.41 
Communications aid  0.21  0.38 0.41 
Education aid   0.29 0.12 0.31 0.28 
Energy aid    0.14 0.51 0.35 
Government and Civil Society aid   0.57  0.43 
Health aid  0.45   0.55 
Industry aid and Mineral resources and 
mining aid  0.56  0.44 
Other Social Infrastructure and services 
aid  0.38  0.11 0.51 
Trade and policy aid 0.15  0.61 0.23 
Transport and Storage aid 0.44 0.13 0.27 0.16 
Water Supply and Sanitation aid    0.50  0.50 
After principal component analysis (PCA), we use oblique rotation for maximum factor weight loading on each component. 
 
The following are the PCA process for the World Bank aid types. First, we took the average 
of the aid types by the recipient. Second, the World Bank aid has 13 aid types, but one aid type 
was not initially captured in the PCA due to low observations. To resolve this, we categorized the  
aid type with its similar aid type before applying PCA. That is,  General environmental protection 
aid is added to health aid.  
We apply the same  PCA process, describe in Appendix D.1 above,  on the World Bank 
aid types. The three factors component with eigenvalues above one in the World Bank types of aid 
data jointly explained 96 percent variations in the data. 
Thus, the PCA result for the World Bank aid types is displayed in Appendix table D.2. 
Finally, the three components were renamed according to their loading on each aid type in 
Appendix table D.2.  Therefore, Appendix table D.2 shows that a substantial part of  Agriculture 
and Forestry aid, health aid, Other Social Infrastructure, and services aid, others are Banking and 
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Financial Services, and transport aid loads on component one we rename this the World Bank 
economic aid. Likewise, a substantial part of  Industry aid and Mineral resources and mining aid; 
water supply, and sanitation aid; part of energy aid, transport and storage aid loads on component 
two, we rename this as the World Bank infrastructure aid. Moreover, a considerable part of 
communication aid, trade and policy aid, and education aid loads on component three, we rename 


























Comp2  ( the U.S 
social aid) 
Comp3 (the U.S 
economic aid residual 
Agriculture aid 0.27  0.34 0.39 
Business and other Financial services 
aid  0.31   0.69 
Communication aid  0.32   0.68 
Education aid 0.28 0.11 0.11 0.50 
Energy aid  0.31   0.69 
Trade policy and Regulations aid 0.26 0.16  0.58 
Health aid  0.11 0.51 0.38 
Industry, Mineral resources, Mining, 
and Reconstruction aid. 0.30   0.70 
Other Social infrastructure aid    0.71 0.29 
Transport and Storage aid  0.32   0.62 
Water Supply and Sanitation aid.  0.54  0.46 
Emergence response aid   0.41  0.59 
Administration and oversight aid  0.51  0.49 
Other multisector  0.43  0.57 
Government and civil society aid  0.31  0.13 0.56 
Conflict, Peace, and Security aid  0.31   0.69 
Disaster prevention and Preparedness 
aid 0.28 0.16 0.27 0.29 
After principal component analysis (PCA), we apply oblique rotation for maximum factor weight loading on each component. 
 
We apply the same  PCA process, describe in Appendix D.1 above,  on the U.S. aid types. 
The three factors component with eigenvalues above one in the U.S. types of aid data jointly 
explained 90 percent variations in the data. The U.S. aid has 26 aid types, but PCA did not initially 
capture nine aid types due to low observations.109 
 
109 To resolve this, we categorized these nine aid types with their similar aid types before applying PCA. Thus, all the aid types were now captured 
in the PCA. The first stage categorizations are: (1) operating expenses aid, Program Design, and Learning aid are added to administration and 
oversight, (2) food aid is added to agriculture aid, (3) Action Relating to Debt aid, and Business and Other Services aid are added to Banking and 
Financial Services aid, (4) General environmental protection aid is added to health aid, (5) budget support aid is added to government and civil 




The PCA result for the U.S aid types is displayed in Appendix table D.3. Finally, the three 
components were renamed according to their loading on each aid type in Appendix table D.3.  
Therefore, Appendix table D.3 shows a substantial percentage of the industry, mineral resources 
and mining aid, reconstruction aid, energy aid, communication aid, and transport and storage aid 
loads on component one: we called this the U.S. infrastructure aid. Furthermore, a high percentage 
of administration and oversight aid emergency aid, Other multisector load on component two we 
called this the U.S. social aid.  
  Likewise, a substantial part of Agriculture and food aid, health aid, other social 
infrastructure aid, and disaster prevention and preparedness aid loads on component three we 















RESIDUAL AID FOR CHAPTER III 
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Table E.1 Growth effects of Residual aid (China, U.S., World Bank). Annual Data 2000-2014.for chapter 3. 
HT-IV 
  GDP per capita growth   GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth 
  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A)  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B)  (1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) 
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    0.011** 
(0.005) 
    0.012*** 
(0.004) 
    0.013*** 
(0.005) 
























Hausman Test   7.970 14.990 22.780 21.740  13.730 16.460 24.760 25.620  9.960 14.670 22.190 24.620 
Prob > chi2  0.047 0.010 0.004 0.010  0.003 0.006 0.002 0.002  0.019 0.012 0.005 0.002 
R-squared   0.006 0.009 0.018 0.023  0.016 0.017 0.022 0.027  0.014 0.014 0.019 0.025 
Observations  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380  1,545 1,410 1,380 1,380 
Number of Countries  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92  103 94 92 92 























VARIABLE DESCRIPTION FOR CHAPTER III 
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Table F.1 Variable use in estimation for chapter 3 
Variable   Description        Source 
GDP per capita 
growth 
 GDP per capita growth (annual %)  World Bank (2017). 
GDP per capital  GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$)  World Bank (2017). 
 China types of aid   The amount is measure in USD, and US$ deflated 2014.  AidData.org 
World Bank types of 
aid  
 The amount is measure in USD, and US$ deflated 2011.  AidData.org 
U.S types of aid   The U.S. aid data is measure in USD and constant values.  USAID 
Trade (% of GDP)  Trade (% of GDP)  World Bank (2017). 
Investment rate  Gross capital formation as a percent of GDP   World Bank (2017). 
Government 
expenditure 
 General government final consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
 World Bank (2017). 
Life expectancy  Life expectancy at birth, total (years). It represents health 
status indicator and a measure of living standard and improve 
lifestyle. 
 World Bank (2017) 
Democracy (Polity2)  The polity2 dataset rank countries years on an index ranging 
from -10 (strongly autocratic) to + 10 (strongly democratic). 
Therefore, polity2 captures democracy in order of increasing 
democracy in a country 





 Durable captures the number of years since the most recent 
regime change, where regime refers to a country's political 
system, and regime change is a three-point change in the polity 
score in the past three years or less.  
 Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, 
2019). 
 
Disasters  Total number affected per million  (EM-DAT, 2018). 
Economic Freedom 
Index (Fraser freedom 
index) 
 The Fraser freedom index captures the economic institutions 
of the recipient countries of education aid. We term this 
variable the economic freedom index in our paper. The 
economic freedom index is on a scale of 1 to 10. Here, 10 
represents the highest level of economic freedom in a country. 
This index is robust (just like the political freedom index). The 
Fraser freedom index includes a range of factors that, as much 
as possible, measure the economic environment of a country. 
Some of these are trade, government consumption 
expenditure, investment rate, state protection of ownership of 
property, the extent to which the people can make personal 
choices—protection of property rights. Others are Judicial 
independence, Impartial courts, legal enforcement of 
contracts, business costs of crime, Gender Adjustment, Money 
growth, inflation, business regulation, and a host of others  
 (Gwartney et al., 2018).  
 
Coup   Successful coups: Number of successful coups d’etat that 
occurred in the year of record. 
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Table G.1 HT-IV SAS codes for chapter 3. 
Table  We used  SAS software 9.4: SAS/STAT 14.2 for all the estimations. 
Additional host information: X64_10HOME WIN 10.0.19041  Workstation 
The SAS codes of HT-IV estimations in Tables 6 to 18 in our paper are displayed below:  
Table 3.6 (column 
1A) 
 
* Hausman-Taylor estimator in PROC PANEL; 
proc panel data=work.aidtypecola; 
id country year; 
instruments correlated = (laglogchnaidecon); 
model newgdppercagro  = laglogchnaidecon laglngdppercap laggcfpgdp/ htaylor; 
run; 
Table 3.6 (column 
2A) 
* Hausman-Taylor estimator in PROC PANEL; 
proc panel data=work.aidtyecolb; 
id country year; 
instruments correlated = (laglogchnaidecon); 
model  newgdppercagro = laglogchnaidecon  laglngdppercap laggcfpgdp laggcsumpgdp lagpolity2 / 
htaylor; 
run; 
Table 3.6 (Column 
3A) 
* Hausman-Taylor estimator in PROC PANEL group C; 
proc panel data=work.aidtypecolcd; 
id country year; 
instruments correlated = (laglogchnaidecon); 
model  newgdppercagro = laglogchnaidecon laglngdppercap laggcfpgdp laggcsumpgdp lagpolity2 
laglifeexpec lagdurable laglogdisatotalaff_ok/ htaylor; 
run; 




* Hausman-Taylor estimator in PROC PANEL group D; 
proc panel data=work.aidtypecola; 
id country year; 
instruments correlated = (laglogchnaidecon); 
model  newgdppercagro = laglogchnaidecon laglngdppercap laggcfpgdp laggcsumpgdp lagpolity2 
laglifeexpec lagdurable laglogdisatotalaff_ok lagtrade/ htaylor; 
run; 
For the rest of the tables for Chinese aid types, we replaced laglogchnaidecon with laglogchnaidsocn, 
laglogchnaidinfra. For the U.S. aid types we run the regression on laglogusaidecon, laglogusaidsocn, 
laglogusaidinfran, Again, for the World Bank aid types we run the regression on laglogwbaidecon, 
laglogwbaidsocn, laglogwbaidinfran.  
Table 3.6 (column 
1C) 
* Hausman-Taylor estimator in PROC PANEL; 
proc panel data=work.naidgaptwoowitg; 
id country year; 
instruments correlated = (laglogchnaidecon laglogusaidecon laglogchusecon); 
model newgdppercagro  = laglogchnaidecon laglogusaidecon laglogchusecon laglngdppercap 
laggcfpgdp / htaylor; 
run; 
This is a sample of the interaction effects we run in all the remaining tables. 
 Where: newgdppercagro is GDP per capita growth (annual%). Again,  
laglogchnaidecon, laglogchnaidsocn laglogchnaidinfran are the one-year lag of the log of China 
economic, social, and infrastructure aid, respectively. And laglogusaidecon laglogusaidsocn 
laglogusaidinfran are the one-year lag of the log of the U.S. economic, social, and infrastructure aid, 
respectively. Likewise, laglogwbaidecon laglogwbaidsocn laglogwbaidinfran are the one-year lag of 
the log of the World Bank economic, social, and infrastructure aid. laglogchusecon is the one-year lag 
of the log of the interaction of China economic aid and the U.S. economic aid. 
Furthermore, laglngdppercap is the lag of the log of GDP per capita, laggcfpgdp laggcfpgdp is the lag 
of investment rate, laggcsumpgdp is the lag of government expenditure, lagpolity2 is the lag of 
polity2, laglifeexpec is the lag of life expectancy at birth, lagdurable is the lag of durable, 
laglogdisatotalaff_ok is the lag of the log of disaster, lagtrade lag trade is the lag of trade,   
Note: lag here means the variable is lag by one period (t-1). 
 
